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Abstract
For years, marketing practitioners and scholars have acknowledged consumersWord
Of Mouth (WOM) as a key driving force behind the success of new products and tech-
nological innovations, and more generally for an e¤ective rm communication over time.
Marketing managers have developed WOM-marketing tools to take better advantage of
buzz.
This thesis is comprised of three essays on WOMmarketing in a dynamic context that
consider several strategies that a company can use to enhance WOM and to accelerate
the di¤usion of new products from a managerial perspective. We also discuss relatively
recent WOM online communication tools, such as a¢ liate marketing, their e¤ectiveness
and dynamic e¤ects.
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
 Inventors can commercialize innovative products by themselves and simultaneously
license the technology to other rms. The licensee may cannibalize sales of the
licensor, but this can be compensated by gains from royalties. In the rst essay
of this thesis, we show how licenses can be used strategically to speed up the new
product di¤usion process in two instances of markets: (i) a market with strong
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), and (ii) a market with weak IPR holder and
pirate rivals. The main ndings suggest that licensing is a benecial strategy for a
licensor in the context of strong IPR, because licensor benets from the royalties,
the advertising investment and positive word-of-mouth e¤ects by licensees. We
compare this result with a weak IPR context, where piracy speeds up the product
di¤usion but this does not compensate IPR holder for the sales loss e¤ect who
is willing to license to get some royalties. However, pirates do not generally nd
interesting the licensing agreement. We present a comparative statics analysis based
on numerical simulation. We illustrate the application of the proposed licensing
model to incandescent light bulbs industry in the United Kingdom.
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 Managing di¤usion waves for successive product generations implies that marketing
managers should try persuade some customers to swim over the successive gener-
ation waves optimally for the company prots, as well as to lessen the regret of
old-generation product buyers. In the second essay we discuss how trade-in rebates
can be used to reintegrate owners of old versions of the product to the market and
therefore accelerate current sales. We rst build a general di¤usion model for suc-
cessive product generations. We study the optimal behavior of the rm controlling
the prices and rebates associated to product upgrades. In order to quantify the
e¤ect of upgrade-rebate strategy, we particularize the general model for some con-
crete examples and numerically solve them for certain sets of parameter values. We
demonstrate that the trade-in program accelerates the di¤usion of the later gen-
erations but has the reverse e¤ect for the di¤usion of the old generation product.
The size of the percentage gain in prots varies depending on several conditions,
providing a 2-5% increase in total discounted prots. We illustrate the applicability
of the model for automobile industry in Spain for the period from 1970 to 2000.
 In the third essay of the thesis, we focus on the analysis of the e¤ectiveness of a¢ l-
iate marketing. Many online customers who visit a retailers website through a¢ l-
iate companies may later return to the retailer for a subsequent purchase through
other web tra¢ c sources. These customers might refer other potential online shop-
pers through word of mouth e¤ect. On the other hand, a¢ liate companies might
cannibalize the retailers other marketing e¤ort. In the third essay we study the
dynamic e¤ect of a¢ liate marketing on the advertisers tra¢ c, sales and revenues.
Because a¢ liates vary in the volume of their operations, contribution to the ad-
vertisers online sales, in their marketing tools and strategies, the e¤ect of a¢ liates
on advertisers sales and revenues is likely to be heterogeneous across a¢ liates.
Given the large number of a¢ liates, estimation using standard VAR or VEC Mod-
els is challenging because of large dimensions involved. Instead, we employ GVAR
analysis introduced by Pesaran et al (2004). We present an empirical application
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based on data from an online retailer of jewelry. Our ndings reect in detail the
dynamic forces shaping the a¢ liate marketing industry. The results of Impulse
Response Function analysis show signicant long term e¤ect of a¢ liate marketing
that clearly di¤ers across a¢ liates.
Resumen en Español
Durante años, los profesionales y académicos dedicados al marketing han identicado
la estrategia del marketing boca a boca(denotada por el acrónimo anglosajón WOM
por Word-of Mouth) como una fuerza impulsora clave para el éxito empresarial. Los
gerentes de marketing deben tener en cuenta la presencia y el impacto del marketing
boca-de-boca para las empresas y cómo las empresas pueden aprovechar mejor los efectos
de esta. Esta tesis se compone de tres ensayos sobre el marketing boca a boca en un
contexto dinámico que evalúa cómo una empresa puede beneciarse de esta estrategia
puesto que tiene un efecto de aceleración de sus ventas y si las estrategias de WOM
de comunicación, como el marketing de aliados, resultan estrategias atractivas para la
empresa.
Las principales contribuciones de esta tesis pueden resumirse así:
 Los inventores pueden comercializar ellos mismos productos innovadores y simultánea-
mente conceder licencias sobre la tecnología a otras rmas. El licenciatario o licenci-
ado (o entidad que adquiere la licencia) puede canibalizar las ventas del licenciador
(o titular de una licencia) pero este efecto puede verse compensado por las ganan-
cias provenientes de las regalías o canon por disfrute de los derechos de la licencia.
En el primer ensayo mostramos cómo se pueden usar estratégicamente las licencias
para comercialización de nuevos productos para acelerar su proceso de difusión en
dos tipos de mercado: (i) un mercado donde los derechos de propiedad intelectual
están fuertemente protegidos, y (ii) un mercado con derechos de propiedad donde
éstos no están tan protegidos y empresas rivales comercializan versiones piratas.
Los resultados obtenidos muestran que, en presencia de mercados fuertemente pro-
tegidos, la concesión de licencias es una estrategia conveniente para un licenciador
(que se benecia de los cánones por cesión, la inversión en publicidad y el efecto
positivo del boca a boca entre los licenciatarios). Comparado este resultado con
el obtenido en un mercado menos protegido, observamos que observando quela pi-
ratería acelera la difusión de los productos pero el licenciante sufre una pérdida de
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ventas que no se ve compensada de ninguna forma ya queen general los piratas no
están interesados en el acuerdo de licencia y no se paga ningún canon. El estudio
naliza con un análisis de estática comparativa basado en simulaciones numéricas,
y un estudio empírico del modelo de licencias en la industria de lamparas incan-
descentes en Reino Unido.
 Cuando se introducen nuevas generaciones de un producto duradero, la superposi-
ción de ventas de cada una de ellas recuerdan una secuencia de olas. En este
capítulo se considera una estrategia para la dirección de marketing ante las distin-
tas oleadas de nuevas , motivando a los clientes de las primeras generaciones para
que se pasen a las de nueva generación. Este trasvase implica mayores benecios
para la empresa y una mejora de la satisfacción de los clientes de productos de vieja
generación. En concreto, se estudia cómo las promociones de canje por cambio de
generación pueden usarse para convencer a los consumidores de versiones antiguas
del producto pasarse a versiones más actualizadas y, de paso, acelerar las ventas
de productos más actuales. Para ello, primero construimos un modelo general de
difusión para generaciones sucesivas de productos. Después, estudiamos el com-
portamiento de decisión óptimo de la empresa controlando por los precios y las
promociones asociadas a la actualización de productos. Con el n de cuanticar
el efecto de las promociones (descuentos en la actualización del producto), con-
struimos diversos modelos que representan distintas situaciones del mercado, y los
resolvemos numéricamente para ciertos valores de los parámetros. Demostramos
que los descuentos por actualización de la generación del producto aceleran la di-
fusión de las últimas generaciones pero presentan el efecto contrario en la difusión
de los productos de la vieja generación. El tamaño de la ganancia porcentual en los
benecios depende de varias condiciones, presentándose un aumento entre el 2 y el
5% en total de los benecios descontados. Además, mostramos la aplicabilidad del
modelo propuesto en la industria de autómobiles en España en el periodo de 1970
a 2000.
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 El tercer capítulo de la tesis se centra en el estudio del marketing de aliados. Mu-
chos de los clientes virtuales que visitan la página web de un minorista a través de
compañías aliadas probablemente volverán al minorista para realizar una compra
subsecuente a través de otras fuentes de tráco en línea. Estos clientes pueden ref-
erenciar a otros compradores virtuales por medio del boca a boca. Por otra parte,
las compañías aliadas pueden canibalizar el resto del esfuerzo de marketing del
minorista. En el tercer ensayo estudiamos el efecto dinámico del marketing por al-
iación en el tráco, las ventas y los ingresos del anunciante. Puesto que los aliados
dieren en el volumen de operaciones, en la contribución a las ventas en línea, en
sus herramientas y estrategias de marketing, su efecto en las ventas y los ingresos
del anunciante probablemente es heterogéneo. Dado el gran número de aliados,
la estimación usando modelos VAR o VEC es un problema intratable debido a las
dimensiones involucradas. En su lugar, usamos la teoría GVAR propuesto por Pe-
seran et al (2004). Presentamos una aplicación empírica basada en un minorista
de joyería on-line. Nuestros resultados muestran en detalle las fuerzas dinámicas
que dan forma a la industria del marketing por aliación. Los resultado del análisis
basados en la función de impulso-respuesta muestran que el efecto de largo plazo
del marketing por aliación es signicativo y diere claramente entre aliados.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Power of Word of Mouth
The phenomenon of word of mouth has been acknowledged for several years. A large
body of academic studies, industry market research and empirical evidence have shown
the important role of word of mouth in consumer behavior and rm actions. Arndt
(1967) was one of the earliest scholars in marketing to characterize word of mouth as
oral, person-to-person communication between a receiver and a communicator whom the
receiver perceives as non-commercial, regarding a brand, product or a service. However,
in digital age word of mouth does not have to be necessarily face-to-face, direct, or oral,
and could be also focused on an organization and not only a brand or product (Buttle,
1998).
Several articles have been published about word of mouth covering numerous topics.
In the context of new product introduction, word of mouth is of crucial importance
for the di¤usion of innovation. The di¤usion of innovations is usually dened as the
dynamic process by which the information about a social innovation (e.g. a product or
service) is communicated to the members of the social system through mass media and
interpersonal channels (Rogers, 1995). Product innovation di¤usion models have a long
history in marketing, but the most successful model was proposed in a seminal paper by
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Bass (1969). Mahajan et al (1990, 1993), Chandrasekaran and Tellis (2007) and more
recently, Peres et al (2010) provide critical review of di¤usion models, while Sultan et al.
(1990) conduct meta-analysis of di¤usion models.
A large number of researchers have studied di¤erent marketing mix decisions account-
ing for word of mouth e¤ect advertising (e.g. Horsky and Simon, 1983; Horsky and
Mate, 1988), price (e.g. Robinson and Lakhani, 1975; Kalish, 1985; Krishnan et al. 1999;
Bass et al. 1994), shelf space (e.g. He and Sethi, 2008), etc. For the case of advertising,
word of mouth generates a ripple e¤ect, making the e¤ect of advertising long-lasting
(Monahan, 1984; Hogan et al, 2004).
Taking a di¤erent perspective, other scholars have studied the innovation adoption
decision by individuals (e.g. Horsky 1990; Weerahandi and Dalal 1992), as well as the
heterogeneity in the communication behavior of adopters (e.g. Goldenberg et al. 2001).
Using individual adoption model, Ho et al. (2012) study how rms can control the social
contagion process and actively inuence on the di¤usion acceleration. Word of mouth
has also been studied in the context of multiple product generations di¤usion (Norton
and Bass, 1987; Mahajan and Muller, 1996; Jiang and Jain, 2012), di¤erent segments
of adopters (Mahajan and Muller, 1998; Goldenberg et al, 2002; Lehmann and Esteban-
Bravo, 2006), among others. Other studies have attempted to quantify the e¤ect of word
of mouth on rm performance (e.g. Luo, 2009; Trusov et al. 2009).
Hence, marketing managers should account for the presence of word of mouth e¤ect,
harness the power of word of mouth and optimally utilize it for the companys prots.
In this thesis, employing optimal control theory and applied econometrics techniques,
in three di¤erent essays we show how a company could benet from the power of word
of mouth by accelerating its sales. We also shed light on the e¤ectiveness of an online
advertising tool, such as a¢ liate marketing, taking into account the word of mouth e¤ect.
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1.2 Dissertation Outline
The di¤erent chapters of the thesis all reect the importance of word of mouth in three dif-
ferent marketing contexts: commercialization of radical product innovation, management
of multiple product generation di¤usion, and a¢ liate marketing. This section provides
an overall outline of the dissertation.
First Essay: Licensing Radical Innovations
In the rst chapter of the dissertation we investigate how licensing can be used to
speed up the di¤usion of new products. Licensing an innovation implies that the inventor
sacrices with its market share to the licensee companies. This research study considers
sales di¤usion process and looks at the benets of licensing as a strategy to improve the
licensors prots by speeding up the sales di¤usion through advertising investments and
word-of-mouth e¤ects of licensee companies.
The initial di¤usion process of radical innovations is usually characterized by a slow
growth that is afterwards followed by a large increase known as sales "takeo¤" (e.g.,
Mahajan et al. 1990, Rogers 1995, Golder and Tellis 1997). The take-o¤ time and the
speed of the di¤usion are critical for companies with deep implications over the supply-
chain, inventory and product distribution management. It has also a crucial impact on
rm value (an early takeo¤ increases the net present value of the innovation, as revenues
cashed into the distant future are heavily discounted). Thus, there has been much interest
to study the take-o¤ time and the speed of the di¤usion. The time to takeo¤ in the sales
di¤usion of radical product innovations can vary considerably (e.g., Mahajan et al. 1990,
Golder and Tellis 1997). There are also demand cultural factors suggesting that sales
takeo¤ can vary over di¤erent countries (Tellis, Stremersch and Yin 2003).
Most of the managers favor faster di¤usion of the products which they launch in
the market. Previous literature has established that marketing mix factors, particularly
price-decreases and advertising e¤ort, can partially explain the takeo¤times and di¤usion
speed (e.g., Stoneman and Ireland 1983, Golder and Tellis 1997, 2004, Foster et al. 2004).
In addition, Agarwall and Bayus (2002) found that the entry of new competitors during
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the early years of the market can push the demand outward, driven by improvements
in product quality, distribution infrastructures, and higher awareness, suggesting that
rm entrance may dominate the classical marketing-mix factors in explaining the takeo¤
times. In the rst essay we consider licensing as a strategy to accelerate sales di¤usion.
Competition between the licensor and the licensees speeds up the sales of the newly
commercialized product due to more innovation through combined advertising e¤ort and
cross-word of mouth e¤ect. As a consequence, for a monopolistic Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR) holder sales acceleration e¤ect and revenue e¤ect due to licensing xed
fees and royalties outweigh rent dissipation e¤ect due to sacrice of market share to the
licensees.
An analytical dynamic model is presented, featuring the licensor-licensee behavior as
an open-loop Nash equilibrium in a di¤erential game. We show that the consequences of
this strategy are di¤erent in the context of strong and weak IPR protection. We obtain
optimal policies of marketing mix and licensing fees in both IPR contexts. To get in-
depth insight of licensing strategy, we also provide a sensitivity analysis to the models
parameters based on numerical simulations. Based on the analysis of the dynamic model
and comparative statics, we provide several managerial implications for a rm considering
licensing as a strategy to get faster sales. As a nal step, we provide an empirical
application of the proposed licensing model to incandescent light bulbs industry in the
United Kingdom.
Second Essay: Upgrade-Rebate Programs
In the second essay we show how trade-in rebates could be used to manage technolog-
ical di¤usion waves. Analyzing the trade-in strategy in a dynamic context, we investigate
how it can be used to control the whole di¤usion of the successive technological genera-
tions accelerating the di¤usion process of later generations through word of mouth e¤ect
of upgraders.
In the context of multiple product generation di¤usion, there are several issues present.
The older generations of the product are usually perceived as of worse quality than the
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new generations, and thus rms lower their prices (Koenigsberg and Ferguson, 2007).
Sales of di¤erent generations cannibalize each other while rms sell them simultaneously.
Further, the fear of obsolescence may cause some of the customers to refuse buying
the earlier generations and wait for the new generation releases (Cohen et al. 1996;
Dhebar 1996; Venkatesh and Brown, 2001). Although second hand markets might reduce
this threat of leapfrogging, they also create additional competition for the rm (Desai,
Koenigsberg, and Purohit, 2007).
Most of the previous models analyze rebate programs in static context. Previous
research considered trade-ins as a strategic link between reverse and direct channels
management (Ray, Boyaci, and Aras, 2005), as a price discrimination policy (Lee and
Lee, 1998), as a tool to disable second hand market (Levinthal and Purohit, 1989),
as a means to increase purchase frequency of quasi-durable goods (Ackers and Reyniers,
1995). We take a di¤erent approach analyzing the trade-in strategy in a dynamic context,
where we show how the company could create a tsunami of a new generation through an
upgrade-rebate program due to word of mouth acceleration e¤ect of the upgraders.
Building on previous work regarding of technology generation di¤usion (Norton and
Bass, 1987, 1992, Mahajan and Muller 1996, and Stremersch, Muller and Peres 2010),
we rst present a general di¤usion model for successive K generations of durable product
each generation with its own market potential. The model allows for leapfrogging, can be
applied to study di¤usion of non-durable and semi-durable products, and can be easily
adapted to analyze upgrade-rebate program. In the model where rebate programs are
present, those customers who trade-in, generate word of mouth a¤ecting the di¤usion of
product generations.
We then particularize the general model for some concrete examples (two and three
product generations, inclusion of prices as decision variable, free rebates). We utilize
tools of optimal control theory (Kamien and Schwartz, 1991) and numerical methods
to solve for rms optimal decision problem for a certain set of parameters. For all the
cases we show that trade-ins accelerate the di¤usion of subsequent generations but have
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the reverse e¤ect on the di¤usion of the old generation products. In order to quantify
the e¤ect of the program, we compute the optimal discounted prots under scenarios of
implementing upgrade-rebate strategy or not. We nd that the implementation of the
upgrade-rebate strategy provides a 2-5% increase in total discounted prots.
We also nd that for the rm it is optimal to provide to the upgraders rebate amounts
even higher than the price of the new generation up to some time. This is in line with the
ndings of studies in the context of one product generations about subsidizing adopters
and product give aways (e.g. Kalish and Lilien 1983, Lehmann and Esteban-Bravo 2006).
Finally, using cars sales and scrappages we illustrate the applicability of the model for
automobile industry in Spain for the period from 1970 to 2000.
Third Essay: A¢ liate Marketing
The third essay of the dissertation studies the dynamic performance of a¢ liate mar-
keting. Using Global Vector Auroregression (GVAR) methodology, we investigate and
quantify the indirect and dynamic e¤ect of a¢ liate marketing on the advertisers tra¢ c,
sales and revenues. We also examine the long-term e¤ect of each a¢ liates tra¢ c on sales
quantity and dollar amount provided to the advertiser.
A¢ liate marketing is an important source of customer acquisition of many online
retailers (Ho¤man and Novak, 2000; Libai et al, 2003). In fact, Forrester Research
estimates that a¢ liate marketing spending in the United States will reach $4 billion
by 2014, with annual growth rate of 16%. A¢ liate marketing program consists of an
online retailer placing a link on a third party (i.e. a¢ liates) website. The advertiser
pays the a¢ liates a referral fee for every referral that has been converted into a buyer
(pay-per-conversion). Another commonly used mechanism is called pay-per-lead, when
the payment is done regardless whether the referrals are converted into buyers or not
(Libai et al., 2003).
Only immediate visits and generated revenues are attributed to a¢ liate company.
However, we propose that there are also dynamic e¤ects of a¢ liate marketing which are
not reected in the traditional managerial metrics (e.g. click through rate, conversion
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rate, etc.). These dynamic e¤ects are due to word of mouth e¤ect, since some of the
customers may refer other potential buyers to the website. Also, the customers acquired
by a¢ liates may later return to the online retailers website through other channels of
tra¢ c for a subsequent purchase which should be attributed to a¢ liate marketing. On
the other hand, a¢ liates may cannibalize the merchants other marketing e¤ort (i.e. they
refer those customers who would visit the retailers website in any case).
In an empirical application with data from an online retailer of jewelry, we study the
impact of a¢ liate marketing on the advertisers performance. A¢ liate companies vary in
the volume of their operations, contribution to the advertisers online sales (Ray, 2001),
marketing strategies, website design, etc. Thus, we posit that the e¤ect of a¢ liates on
advertisers sales and revenues is heterogeneous across a¢ liates. We quantify the e¤ect of
a¢ liate marketing on merchants sales and revenues using recent advances in the analysis
of dynamic factor models.
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. In the next chapter we
present the essay entitled Licensing Radical Product Innovations to Speed up the Di¤u-
sion. The third chapter deals with the essay entitled Riding Successful Technological
Di¤usion Waves: Building a Tsunami via Upgrade-Rebate Programs. In the fourth
chapter we focus on the essay entitled The Dynamic Performance of A¢ liate Market-
ing.
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Chapter 2
Licensing Radical Product
Innovations to Speed Up the
Di¤usion
2.1 Introduction
Instead of commercializing the innovation alone, an inventing rm can license the product
technology to one or more other rms. A license is a contract by which an IPR holder
rm (licensor) transfers the right to exploit its innovation to another rm (licensee) under
certain conditions and for a certain period of time. Licensing generates two forces on
licensors prot: revenue e¤ect (licensing payments by the licensees to the IPR holder)
and rent dissipation e¤ect (erosion of licensors prot due to additional competition in the
product market). On a rst look, licensing IPR is a daring decision as the rent dissipation
e¤ects might be stronger than the revenue one. The early literature on licensing is focused
on static models (for a review see, e.g., Shapiro 1985 and Kamien 1992). More recently,
Arora and Fosfuri (2003) develop a framework to understand licensing and competition.
Indeed, a monopolist IPR holder will not license as the rent dissipation e¤ect is greater
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than the revenue e¤ect. Moreover, in practice, we observe that royalties are often low,
and licensors capture only a small fraction of the rents from the innovation (e.g., Caves et
al. 1983, Arora 1997). Arrow (1962) remarks show how striking this feature is: Patent
royalties are generally so low that the prots from exploiting ones own invention are not
appreciably greater than those derived from the use of othersknowledge. Why the rm
that has developed the knowledge cannot demand a greater share of the resulting prots?
Surprisingly, licensing is a pervasive phenomenon. According to the License! Global 2008
Annual Report, the total worldwide retail sales of licensed merchandize reached $191.7
billion in 2007. How can this contradiction be explained?
A potential solution to this conundrum could lie hidden in the dynamics of innovation
adoption. The di¤usion of new products is typically modeled with rst order di¤erential
equations where the solution is an Sshape curve. After commercialization, the early
di¤usion of radical innovations is usually characterized by a slow growth that is eventually
followed by a sharp increase known as sales takeo¤(e.g., Mahajan et al. 1990, Rogers
1995, Golder and Tellis 1997). Di¤usion takeo¤ time and speed are critical for the com-
pany, with deep implications over the supply-chain, inventory and product distribution
management. It has also a crucial impact on rm value (an early takeo¤ increases the
net present value of the innovation, as revenues cashed into the distant future are heavily
discounted). The time to takeo¤ in the sales di¤usion of radical product innovations
can vary considerably (e.g., Mahajan et al. 1990, Golder and Tellis 1997). There are
also demand cultural factors suggesting that sales takeo¤ can vary on di¤erent countries
(Tellis, Stremersch and Yin 2003). Over the last decade, there has been much inter-
est in explaining sales takeo¤ of product innovation di¤usion. The literature is mostly
descriptive and has established that marketing mix factors, particularly price-decreases
and advertising e¤ort, can partially explain the takeo¤ times (e.g., Stoneman and Ireland
1983, Golder and Tellis 1997, 2004, Foster et al. 2004). In addition, Agarwal and Bayus
(2002) found that the entry of new competitors during the early years of the market
can push the demand outward, driven by improvements in product quality, distribution
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infrastructures, and higher awareness, suggesting that rm entrance may dominate the
classical marketing-mix factors in explaining the takeo¤ times. For incremental inno-
vations, there is also some evidence of cross-generation acceleration (Stremersch et al.
2010). In addition, competition can benet market size through advertising (Roberts
and Samuelson 1988). Loosely speaking, the a­ uence of competing rms seems to spur
higher innovation awareness through combined advertising and promotional e¤orts, price
reductions due to rm rivalry, and product di¤erentiation by quality improvements that
(moderated by socio-demographic and environmental factors) can explain the rst large
increase in sales. But innovation ownership is usually protected by the Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (IPR) generating a temporal grant of monopoly power over the right to make
commercial use of ideas. This protection may prevent the entrance of other rms, and
therefore delay the takeo¤ time and/or decrease the di¤usion speed.
This paper considers an alternative reason to license: sales di¤usion acceleration. This
third e¤ect is neglected in static models of licensing. Competition between licensor and
licensees results in faster sales di¤usion due to higher innovation awareness through the
combined marketing e¤ort and cross word-of-mouth e¤ects. As a result, for a monopolis-
tic IPR holder sales di¤usion acceleration and revenue e¤ects dominate rent dissipation
e¤ect (loss of the market to the licensees), and licensing takes place. The marketing lit-
erature supports this idea. Armstrong and Collopy (1996) and Luo, Rindeisch and Tse
(2007) argue that competitor-oriented decisions such as exclusivity are harmful to nan-
cial performance. Recently, Peres and Van den Bulte (2010) discuss that word-of-mouth
turns product monopoly suboptimal.
The success of a licensing strategy depends on the strength of the IPR system. Several
studies have empirically considered the relationship between patent protection and licens-
ing, nding that there is a higher propensity to license in industries with strong patent
protection (e.g., Anand and Khanna 2000, Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006, Gambardella et
al. 2007). We study the use of licenses as a strategy to speed up new products di¤usion
when the IPR holder operates in: (i) a market with strong IPR, and (ii) a market with
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weak IPR and pirate rivals, who commercialize unlicensed product imitations. For each
framework, an analytical dynamic model is presented, featuring the Licensor-Licensee
behavior as an open-loop Nash equilibrium in a di¤erential game.
 In markets with strong IPR protection, our results show that both IPR holders
and licensees can benet from licensing. For the IPR holder licensing is a benecial
strategy because there is an increase in prots due to the acceleration of the sales
di¤usion process, in comparison to the case of monopoly. In comparative statics
we also analyze how sensitive licensing implementation is to the model parameters.
This result stands in contrast to the results drawn from static licensing models.
 Regarding industries with weak IPR protection, we study licensing decision in mar-
kets where IPR holder faces weak competition by pirate companies who sell copy
products with lower quality. From IPR holders perspective, licensing is a benecial
decision due to licensing payments and faster sales di¤usion. However, pirates are
better o¤when selling copy products than licensed products with higher quality as
in the last case they have to pay licensing fees to the IPR holder. Although not
completely ruled out, comparative statics suggests that licensing is less desirable
strategy in the context of weak IPR protection from either the perspective of the
IPR holder or the pirates. This can partially explain, for instance, the slowness
of discography industry to allow licensing through the internet to stop the boom
of piracy in the last decade. Pirates are less interested in this arrangement. This
is supported by the empirical evidence indicating that licensing is less common in
this context (Anand and Khanna 2000, Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006, Gambardella
et al. 2007).
In both cases, we have also obtained rmsoptimal policies for marketing mix and
licensing fees in both of IPR contexts. Interestingly, in strongly protected IPR framework
the discounted prices charged by monopolistic, licensor and licensees are not too di¤erent.
By contrast, in weakly protected IPR context there are higher di¤erences between the
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average prices (which can be explained by the higher independence between the di¤usion
process of pirates and IPR holder). In the case of licensing, optimal xed fees as well as
royalties decrease to zero exponentially. The discounted advertising investments decrease
at an exponential rate in all the cases.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present
the monopolistic innovation di¤usion model for non-durable products that we use as a
benchmark in the paper. In section 3 we characterize optimal licensing, pricing and
advertising strategies and with numerical methods analyze the sensitivity of the optimal
prots to the main parameters, when IPR are strong. In section 4, we conduct similar
analysis for the case when IPR are weak. Section 5 provides an empirical application of
the licensing model to a case of electric bulb licensing in the United Kingdom. Finally,
we conclude the paper with some remarks and suggestions for future research. An online
appendix contains technical results.
2.2 Modelling Setup for Di¤usion
The di¤usion of new products has drawn considerable attention in marketing literature
for both radical product innovations (e.g., Bass 1969; Mahajan et al. 1990, Sultan
et al. 1990, Chandrasekaran and Tellis 2007) and incremental product innovations as
new generations(e.g., Norton and Bass 1987, Mahajan and Muller 1996). A variety of
extensions have incorporated competitive marketing mix variables to control the di¤usion
process (e.g., Robinson and Lakhani 1975, Horsky and Simon 1983, Kalish 1985, Horsky
and Mate 1988, Bass et al. 1994, 2000, Krishnan et al. 1999). The di¤usion literature
deals mainly with monopolies of category level growth, but there are some extensions for
rival brands (e.g., Parker and Gatignon 1994, Bayus et al. 2000, Prasad and Mahajan
2003, Savin and Terwiesch 2005, Libai et al. 2009).
In this section we consider a di¤usion model for a non-durable product. The di¤usion
of a radical innovation follows a Bass-type specication driven by additional marketing
18
mix variables. Similar to Gupta et al. (2006), we consider that _Nt is the net customer
growth, Nt are sales (instead of penetration in classical Bass model) generating returns
(pt   ct)Nt, and there is a proportion k 2 (0; 1) of defections and a potential level of
customersM > 0. Managing the marketing mix the companies can control the dynamics
of the di¤usion-defections balance. Therefore, the customersgrowth is given by
_Nt =

a+ u
Nt
M

(M  Nt)  k Nt

Wt (At; pt) ; N0 = 0; (2.1)
where W (At; pt) conveys the impact of advertising expenditure At and price pt on the
growth of sales. Multiplicative marketing mix impact has been previously considered
in the di¤usion literature, for example, by Bass et al. (1994). This model has been
recently criticized by Fruchter and Van den Bulte (2011). We present an alternative
approach that introduces some attractive features. First, we assume that advertising
has a logarithmic impact on net sales di¤usion, with an e¤ect on market potentials and
defections. Horsky and Simon (1983) suggested the use of advertising logarithms, but
did not consider the e¤ect on market potentials. Second, we consider that the impact
of prices depends on the deviation from an ideal-point price p  0; and this benchmark
evolves according to a reference ination rate of consumption goods r  0, so that the
adoption process is faster when the distance (ertp  pt)2 is smaller. Therefore we have
specied the expression Wt (At; pt) = 1 + b lnAt  m (ertp  pt)2 ; and a; b;m; u;M > 0:
Note that this specication allows p = 0; so that W (At; pt) is monotonously decreasing
with pt. This might be the case of some mass consumption products, but for luxurious
goods we would generally expect large values of p.
Note thatWt (At; pt) = 1 whenAt = 1 and the price equals to the ideal point pt = ertp:
Then a stationary equilibrium is reached when 0 = (a+ uN=M) (M  N)   kN: If
u = 0; with a + k 6= 0 the solution is N = Ma= (a+ k) (which tends to M when the
defection parameter k # 0 decrease or a " 1). For the general case, when u 6= 0; the
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long-term solution is:
N =M
(u  a  k)
q
(u  a  k)2 + 4au
2u
;
which is smaller than the market potential. Obviously, when there are no defections,
k = 0; the long-term equilibrium reaches the market potential as
N = (M=2u)

(u  a) +
q
(a+ u)2

=M
We assume that the innovation is a variable-costs product with marginal cost ct =
c0 e
t where c0 > 0; and  can be negative, zero, or positive, depending on whether
the cost dynamics is dominated by industrial ination or learning e¤ects, or both are
balanced. Note that in most models ct = c0, and we will stress this case. Denote by i > 0
the rm time-preference discount rate, that satises i >  and i > r: The rms present
value of future prots is given by  =
R1
0
e it ((pt   ct)Nt   At) dt: In a monopolistic
setting the rm faces the problem of maximizing prot  subject to the di¤usion equation
(2.1).
Using this framework, we consider two competitive di¤erential games. The rst one
describes a market where the IPR are strongly protected, and the second one describes
a market with weak IPR protection and piracy.
2.3 Licensing Radical Innovations in Markets with
Strong IPR
Denote by the letter h the rm (licensor or IPR holder) that holds a license in a market
with an IPR protection. The IPR holder would be willing to license its innovation, if the
additional revenue from licensing is positive and the monopolys prots are not higher
than those of oligopoly with competing licensees. Next, we describe the two possible
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scenarios: a monopolistic strategy versus licensing strategy.
Strategy 1 Holding a monopolistic position in the market. The rm faces the
problem of maximizing prot by choosing price and advertising e¤ort:
maxhmon
 
pht ; A
h
t ; N
h
t

=
R1
0
e it
  
pht   cht

Nht   Aht

dt
s.t. _Nht =
h
a+ u
Nht
M
  
M  Nht
  khNht iWt  Aht ; pht  ;
Nh0 = 0;
where ph is the product price and Ah the marketing e¤ort, cht are the unit costs,
e i the discount parameter. Denote by hmon the optimal value of the monopolist.
Alternatively, the rm can consider licensing its innovation. Then, the sales di¤usion
of the IPR holder is driven by

N
h
t =

a+ u
Nht
M
+ g
N lt
M
 
M  Nht  N lt
  khNht W ht  Aht ; Alt; pht ; plt ; (2.2)
with W ht
 
Aht ; A
l
t; p
h
t ; p
l
t

= 1 + b lnAht + s lnA
l
t   m
 
ertp  pht
2
+ d
 
ertp  plt
2
; where
b; s;m; d > 0:
Also, the IPR holder charges to each licensee a royalty fee over sales rht and a xed fee
fht . We consider a market potential of L licensees. In order to make the problem tractable,
we consider that all licensed companies are relatively homogenous with constant marginal
cost clt, selling at the same price p
l
t: Therefore, we consider the aggregated sales of all
licensees on a single brand l; and we assume that N lt are the sales of all licensees and
Alt is the total marketing e¤ort. The growth rate _N
l
t depends also on the penetration of
licensed companies lt=L, dened as follows:

N
l
t =

+ 
Nht
M
+ 
N lt
M
+ 
lt
L
 
M  Nht  N lt
  klN lt ; W lt  Aht ; Alt; pht ; plt ; (2.3)
with W lt
 
Aht ; A
l
t; p
h
t ; p
l
t

= 1 +  lnAht +  lnA
l
t + 
 
ertp  pht
2     ertp  plt2 ; where
; ; ;  > 0:
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The number of licensed rms, denoted by lt, follows a Bass di¤usion model in the
following way:

lt =

z1 + z2
lt
L
+ z3
N lt
M

(L  lt)  z4lt

Lt
 
fht ; r
h
t

; (2.4)
with Lt
 
fht ; r
h
t

= 1   z5
 
ertf   fht
2   z6  ertr   rht 2 ; where z5; z6 > 0. The adoption
rate of the licensee companies

lt depends on number of previously adopted companies
with coe¢ cient z2, as well as on the market penetration level of licensees sales with
coe¢ cient z3. In most of the scenarios we assume that there is no deection of licensees,
i.e. z4 = 0. Additionally, the adoption rate of the licensees is controlled by the license
fees fht and r
h
t .
The IPR rm h and the licensee l sell their brands at di¤erent prices, and each rm
benets from the rival advertising to lesser extent, similarly to the model adopted from
Gupta et al. (2006), Libai et al. (2009) and Savin and Terwiesch (2005). We consider
W ht
 
Aht ; A
l
t; p
h
t ; p
l
t

and W lt
 
Aht ; A
l
t; p
h
t ; p
l
t

with positive parameters, therefore for both
players we assume that sales growth increases with the advertising of any rm h and
l, and sales growth decreases (increases) with an increase of own (competitors) price,
i.e. h and l brands are substitutes. As rms generally address their advertising e¤ort to
their targeted segment by emphasizing their own product, and we assume that b > s and
 > ; i.e., the e¤ect of the own advertising in the sales is larger than the competitors
one. Similarly to Dockner and Jorgensen (1988), we assume that for price parameters
m > d;  > ; i.e., the e¤ect of the own price is larger than that of the competitors,
which means that if all rms deviate from the ideal prices, they will encounter a decrease
in their sales growth.
Denote by cht ; c
l
t the unit costs of the IPR holder and the licensee, respectively, which
may be even identical if the production license covers all the know-how required for
production. In this context, the following strategy is considered:
Strategy 2 Allowing a licensed substitute. Consider two substitutive brands (the
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patent holder h and the licensee l). The licensing strategy is characterized by a
dynamic Nash equilibrium as follows:
 LICENSEE: Given the decisions of the licensor Aht ; pht ; rht ; fht 	, the licensees solve
the problem:
maxllic
 
plt; A
l
t; N
l
t

=
R1
0
e it
  
plt   clt   rht

N lt   Alt   fht lt

dt
s.t. (2:2); (2:3); (2:4)
and N l0 = 0; N
l
0 = 0; l0 = 0:
 LICENSOR (IPR HOLDER): Given the decisions of the licensees Alt; plt	, the
licensor solves the problem
maxhlic
 
rht ; f
h
t ; p
h
t ; A
h
t ; N
h
t

=
R1
0
e it
  
pht   cht

Nht   Aht + fht lt + rhtN lt

dt
s.t. (2:2); (2:3); (2:4)
and N l0 = 0; N
l
0 = 0; l0 = 0:
 In the licensing scenario, we denote by hlic and llic the optimal prots for licen-
sor and licensee companies, respectively, in an open-loop Nash equilibrium (for a
denition see the Appendix).
The dynamic Nash equilibrium is generally dened using two alternative approaches:
the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium associated to dif-
ferent information structures. In an open-loop equilibrium, the decision of each agent
satises the rst order conditions of its maximization problem ceteris paribus the actions
of the remainder players. By contrast, in a closed-loop Nash equilibrium it is assumed
that each agent knows exactly how the other players will react to their decisions and
anticipate these reactions in their rst order conditions (see the appendix for a more
formal description). Such managerial omniscience is generally unrealistic, but when it
occurs the (closed-loop) equilibrium path is more robust to dynamic deviations, meaning
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that the closed-loop equilibrium is identied with a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this
paper we consider licensing solution with open-loop information structure.
2.3.1 Optimal Strategic Solution and Numerical Results
To determine whether the licensing strategy is implemented, we compute the optimal
solution with and without licensing.
Licensing decision The decision to license is viable if and only if: hlic  hmon and
llic  0:
To solve the viability of licensing for a particular parametrization of the model, we
should compute the rst order conditions for each rm and study if the licensing condi-
tions are veried. Propositions 1 and 2 in the online Appendix provide the rst order
conditions for the optimal policies based on Strategy 1 and Strategy 2, respectively. The
solution is characterized by a Boundary Value Problem (BVP); i.e. a di¤erential equation
system with initial and terminal conditions. In order to discuss the optimality of the mo-
nopolistic approach (Strategy 1) compared with the licensing decision (Strategy 2) for the
IPR holder, we should solve the optimal control systems substituting the optimal control
expression in the associated BVP. The solution can be computed numerically solving the
BVP with a Galerkin-Collocation method (for an introduction, see Esteban-Bravo and
Vidal-Sanz, 2007).
We compute the optimal policies based on Strategy 1 and Strategy 2 for a set of
parameters. As a base case, we assume an arbitrary total market size of 4000 units.
We use coe¢ cients of innovation of a = 0:002 for the licensor sales,  = 0:002 for the
licensee sales and the coe¢ cients of imitation of u = 0:2; g = 0:2 for the licensor sales,
and  = 0:2;  = 0:2;  = 0:02 for the licensee sales. We assume that the market of
potential licensees is L = 90, with a licensees coe¢ cient of innovation z1 = 2, a coe¢ cient
of imitation of z2 = 0:5 and a sales impact coe¢ cient z3 = 5. The deection rates for
the three state equations are set to 0. We also assume that the variable cost is equal to
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c0 = 20 both for the licensor and licensees (and  = 0). We consider that the ideal-point
of prices, royalty fees and xed fees are p = 100; f = 1200; r = 10; and this benchmark
evolves according to an ination rate r = 0:07: The sensitivity to the deviations from
these ideal-points are set to m = 0:0007, d = 0:0002 for the licensor sales;  = 0:0002,
 = 0:0007 for the licensees sales; and z5 = 0:0000015; z6 = 0:00015 for the licensees
population. The e¢ ciency of the advertising is set to b = 0:01; s = 0:005 for the licensor;
and  = 0:005;  = 0:01 for the licensees. We assume a discount rate of i = 0:1:
For this set of parameters, the optimal prot for monopolist is hmon = 9:6860  106;
and the optimal prots of the licensor and the licensee are hlic = 1:0620  107 and
llic = 6:3513  105, respectively. The results are not surprising. The value of licensing is
 =
 
hlic   hmon

= 9:34  105: Indeed, there is a clear incentive for the IPR holder to
license the innovation, because licensees pay with royalty fees. Actually, the discounted
licensing revenue is about 50% of the total prot of the licensor (decreasing from an
initial 90% down to around 40%). Figure 1 shows that the discounted prots of the
IPR holder increase rapidly to a maximum, and then decay exponentially. But for the
licensing strategy a higher value is achieved at a faster rate. The discounted prots of
the licensee are smaller, but in the long term decay quite slowly.
Figure 1. Discounted optimal prots of the Monopolist, Strong IPR holder and Licensee
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Figure 2 depicts how the sales di¤usion is accelerated when the licensing strategy is
implemented. Initially, the IPR holder has more sales when being a licensor than in a
monopolistic position. The IPR holder implicitly also benets from the advertising e¤orts
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and the cross word-of-mouth inuence of the licensees, which leads to faster di¤usion and,
as a result, more sales per period. Besides, it also gains licensing revenues. For the IPR
holder, taking the monopolistic strategy provides, after some point of time, a higher
level of sales than those obtained if the licensing strategy is implemented. However,
aggregated licensor and licensee sales dominate the monopolist sales before covering the
market potential due to faster di¤usion.
Figure 2. Sales di¤usion in the context of strong IPR
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Discounted optimal prices and discounted optimal marketing e¤ort investments decay
exponentially for all the agents (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Optimal discounted prices and marketing e¤ort under licensing
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Figure 4 depicts the discounted licensing payments, both royalties and xed fees.
Both of them decay exponentially as the market becomes mature.
Figure 4. Discounted licensing payments
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2.3.2 Comparative Statics
To get in-depth insights about the impact of the licensees, we provide a sensitivity analy-
sis to the models parameters. Consider all the parameters in a vector . Using enve-
lope theorem for di¤erential games, we compute how sensitivethe cumulative prots
hmon;
h
lic;
l
lic are to changes in the value of the parameters in case of Strategy 1 and
Strategy 2, respectively, and the partial derivatives @(0) =@ (see the online Appendix
for analytical details about the envelope theorem; the partial derivatives with respect
to each model parameter are available from authors). These expressions involve some
integrals that cannot be solved analytically. Thus, Table 1 reports the numerical values
of the sensitivity analysis.
Table 1: Comparative statics for licensing and monopolistic strategies in strong IPR
framework
 @
@
hlic (108) @@llic (108) @@hmon (108) @@ (108)
a 0:4661  0:3264 0:4681  0:002
u 0:0746  0:0616 0:1196  0:045
M 0:000022 0:0000049 0:000027  0:000005
m  0:5842  0:6066  1:3098 0:7256
p 0:00052 0:0006 0:00098  0:00046
b 0:2521  0:2131 0:1887 0:0634
kh  2:0407 2:0308  0:6618  1:3789
i  3:834  0:7721  4:0179 0:1839
r 3:3085 0:9313 4:0380  0:7295
s 0:2506  0:1937 0 0:2506
d  0:4060  0:6755 0  0:4060
g 0:0915  0:0754 0 0:0915
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 @
@
hlic (108) @@llic (108) @@hmon @@ (108)
  0:1468 0:3205 0  0:1468
  0:0400 0:0593 0  0:0400
  0:0489 0:0726 0  0:0489
  0:4803  0:3269 0  0:4803
  0:7131  0:7767 0  0:7131
  0:1473 0:2510 0  0:1473
  0:1497 0:2350 0  0:1497
kl 1:9515  2:2347 0 1:9515
  0:1407 0:2770 0  0:1407
 @
@
hlic (108) @@llic (108) @@hmon @@ (108)
z1 0:00024 0:000069 0 0:00024
z2 0:000088 0:000063 0 0:000088
z3 0:0000001  0:00004 0 0:0000001
z4  0:0064 0:0093 0  0:0064
z5  1177:53 1316:51 0  1177:53
z6  36:39 37:54 0  36:35
r 0:00062  0:00062 0 0:00062
f 0:00002  0:00002 0 0:00002
L 0:0004  0:0006 0 0:0004
The results are not surprising. We found negative values of @/@a and @/@u
implying that the higher the innovation and word-of-mouth parameters are, the less the
IPR holder is willing to license. When both a and u are large, product sales take o¤
rapidly and the advantage of licensing to speed up the rate of di¤usion of the innovation
is not so clear. In addition, we found positive values of @/@b ; @/@s and @/@g
implying that the higher the impact of direct (or cross) advertising and the word-of-mouth
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on the licensors sales growth, the more desirable the licensing strategy is.
An increase of licensors price sensitivity m implies that licensing is more interesting
since the monopoly prots are reduced more than those of licensing scenario. However,
an increase of licensees price impact parameter dmake licensing strategy less desirable for
the IPR holder. We also found a negative value of @/@p , indicating that for products
with higher desired price level the IPR holder rather prefers to be in a monopolistic
position, than to share the market with licensee companies. Furthermore, the faster the
desired price level evolves (higher ination rate r), the more a monopolistic position is
preferred.
Interestingly, it does not appear to be worthwhile licensing with an increase of the IPR
holders deection rate kh, as the negative impact of higher deection rate on monopoly
prot is smaller than on licensor prot. Importantly, discounting parameter increments
do improve the value of licensing as a takeo¤ anticipation becomes crucial. In other
words, the more a rm is impatient to be rewarded for its innovation, the more an IPR
holder is willing to license.
There is no a straightforward relationship between market potential M and licensing
strategy. Computing the solution with di¤erent parameters, we found out that when
cross advertising e¤ects are moderate-to-large (higher than 0:005), then the higher mar-
ket potential the more desirable a licensing strategy is. By contrast, when the cross
advertising e¤ects are smaller than 0:005, then the higher the market potential the less
desirable a licensing strategy is. This strengthens the idea that companies may consider
both, cross-benets of advertising and the size of the market as structural elements to
consider before a decision is made.
As it comes to the parameters related to the licensee sales growth, the parametric
changes which speed up the licensee sales (higher a, , , , , , and lower kl) make
licensing strategy less desirable. Intuitively, faster licensee sales imply that the IPR
holder receives more royalty revenues earlier. However, it also implies that the licensees
capture the market faster, leaving the IPR holder with less sales revenues.
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Moreover, a higher licensee market potential L; larger z1, z2, z3, and smaller z4, z5,
z6 (speeding up of licensee companies di¤usion and reducing the sensitivity to fees),
make licensing a more attractive strategy. This is because if the IPR holder chooses
the licensing strategy, he would prefer that the licensees "di¤use" faster so that he gets
licensing fees earlier. These results are relatively stable, although we have noticed that
for high levels of production costs @hlic /@z3 becomes small and negative, but if cross
advertising e¤ects is simultaneously set to 0:003 the e¤ect is again positive.
It is important to note that most of the parametric changes that make licensing
contract more attractive for the licensor decrease the total prots earned by the licensees.
However, as long as the licensees get positive prots, licensing is an attractive strategy
for the licensees, as the licensees would get zero prots by not accepting the licensing
contract.
2.4 The Case of Weak IPR Markets
Product licensing decisions should be reconsidered when unlicensed pirate imitations
can be commercialized. The IPR holder faces a weak type of competition from a
substitutive product with worse characteristics. But piracy also speeds up the product
di¤usion, bringing some issues that were not present in monopoly. In this context it is
not so crucial to allow rival pirates to use legal licenses given that the license must be
cheap enough to engage them into the legal binding.
In the weak IPR context, we can study the sales of three possible products: (1) the
IPR holder sales Nht ; (2) the sales of copies produced by the rms without IPR N
c
t ;and
(3) the sales of licensed product N lt if a license agreement is signed. We consider that only
products (1) and (2), or products (1) and (3) are simultaneously observed in the market.
We say that rms that only commercialize products of type (2) follow a pirating strategy.
Often, the quality of the original and copied product is usually di¤erent, and therefore
the competition of IPR holder rm and pirates is weaker than in the case studied in
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Section 2.3. Therefore, we relax the assumption of a joint market potential and assume
that brands can develop independently, with a market potential of Mh for products of
type (1) andM c for products of type (2), so thatM =Mh+M c; and separated di¤usions
(similarly to Parker and Gatignon, 1994, and Gupta et al., 2006)).
The sales of pirate products N ct depend on the number of pirates l
c
t ; and the dynamics
of both variables are cross-related. Therefore, if the licensee is not granted, the di¤usion
of the innovative and pirate products and pirate companies are described by the following
equations:

N
h
t =

a+ u
Nht
Mh
+ g
N ct
M c
 
Mh  Nht
  khNht  W ht  Aht ; Act ; pht ; pct (2.5)
W ht
 
Aht ; A
c
t ; p
h
t ; p
c
t

= 1 + b lnAht + s lnA
c
t  m
 
ertp  pht
2
+ d
 
ertpc   pct
2

N
c
t =

+ 
Nht
Mh
+ 
N ct
M c
+ 
lct
L

(M c  N ct )  kcN ct

W ct
 
Aht ; A
c
t ; p
h
t ; p
c
t

(2.6)
W ct
 
Aht ; A
c
t ; p
h
t ; p
c
t

= 1 +  lnAht +  lnA
c
t   
 
ertpc   pct
2
+ 
 
ertp  pht
2
and
_lct =

z1 + z2
lct
L
+ z3
N ct
M c

(L  lct )  z4lct

(2.7)
By contrast, we assume that in the licensing scenario, products have relatively homo-
geneous quality, and therefore the demand structure is entirely analogous to model (2.2),
(2.3), (2.4), with market potential M = Mh +M c, and the sales are distributed among
both rms accordingly to this model.
Typically the di¤usion parameters of the IPR rm product Nht and the licensed prod-
uct N lt are higher than in the copy N
c
t , due to higher quality of the innovation that
increases the market potential and the speed of the di¤usion (i.e., a > , u > , g > ),
also b > ; s > .
The licensor considers two possible scenarios: competition with pirating strategy
versus licensing strategy (Strategy 2) with M =Mh +M c.
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Strategy 3 Unlicensing benchmark scenario with piracy. The equilibrium is char-
acterized by the dynamic Nash equilibrium as follows:
 Given the decisions of the IPR holder Aht ; pht 	 the pirates, solve
maxcpiracy (p
c
t ; A
c
t ; N
c
t ) =
R1
0
e it ((pct   cct)N ct   Act) dt
s:t: eq: (2:5); (2:6); (2:7)
with N c0 = 0, N
h
0 = 0:
 Given the decisions of the pirates fAct ; pctg, the IPR holder solves the problem
maxhpiracy
 
pht ; A
h
t ; N
h
t

=
R1
0
e it
  
pht   cht

Nht   Aht

dt
s:t: eq: (2:5); (2:6); (2:7)
with N c0 = 0, N
h
0 = 0:
 Under piracy, we denote by hpiracy and cpiracy the optimal prots of IPR holder
and pirates, respectively obtained in the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Alternatively, a licensing agreement can be signed, and therefore, the IPR holder and
the licensee follow Strategy 2 dened in Section 2.3, rendering prots hlic; 
l
lic:
2.4.1 Optimal Strategic Solution and Numerical Results
To determine whether the licensing strategy is implemented, consider the following deci-
sion rule:
Licensing decision The license decision is a viable equilibrium if and only if two con-
ditions holds:
i) The IPR licensor gets higher prots with licensing than without licensing; i.e., hlic 
hpiracy;
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ii) The licensee obtains higher prots commercializing licensed products than unlicensed
substitutes; i.e., llic  cpiracy:
In order to determine whether the Licensing agreement is viable under piracy, we
need to compute the optimal solution based on Strategy 3. The rst order conditions are
given in Proposition 3 in the online Appendix. The solution is characterized by a BVP,
which can be solved numerically.
We compute the optimal policies in a weak IPR context for a set of parameters. As a
base case, we assume the set of parameters given Section 2.3, arbitrarily decomposing the
market size M = 4000 in 2000 units for illegal copies and 2000 for licensed products. We
also tested other asymmetric decompositions without a strong impact on the results (in
particular, the impact of small changes is discussed in the comparative statics section).
We assume lower quality of the innovation for the pirates, and thus, slower growth of
pirate product sales. For that reason, we consider  = 0:001;  = 0:00005;  = 0:0001;
 = 0:15;  = 0:15, which are lower than the parameters considered in Section 2.3. For
this set of parameters, in the context of the weak IPR protection with pirates, the optimal
prots of the IPR holder and the pirates arehpiracy = 5:6249106 andcpiracy = 2:7518106;
respectively. In the context of the weak IPR protection with licenses, the optimal prots
of the IPR holder and the licensee are hlic = 1:0620  107 and llic = 6:3513  105;
respectively. The result suggests that the licensing strategy might be interesting for the
IPR holder (hlic > 
h
piracy), but not for the pirates (
l
lic < 
c
piracy). As a consequence the
license agreement is not implemented. Furthermore, recall that in a strong IPR context
with analogous parameters, the optimal prot for monopolist is hmon = 9:6860  106; so
the di¤erence of
 
hmon   hpiracy

= 4: 0611 106 is the nancial cost of piracy for the IPR
holder, i.e. the economic loss caused to the innovator because of a weak IPR regulation.
The dynamics of the discounted prots in the equilibrium is similar for both the IPR
holder and the pirates; i.e., a fast growth followed by an exponential decay to zero. At
the maximum pirates achieve roughly 3 times the maximum level of discounted prots
obtained by a licensee, but decay faster.
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The previous result also suggests that although piracy may speed up the product
di¤usion of the IPR holder through word of mouth and communication of pirates (Figure
5 shows the sales di¤usion in a market with pirates compared to that of a monopolist IPR
holder), this advantage is not enough to compensate the innovator for the market-share
loss. Under a licensing agreement, the royalties would reduce the damage, rendering
hlic = 1:0620  107, which is higher than the return in a monopoly. However, pirates do
not receive reciprocal benets from the licensing contract.
Figure 5: Sales di¤usion in the context of weak IPR:
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The dynamic pattern of the optimal discounted prices and marketing e¤ort invest-
ments for weak IPR protection scenario is similar that of an analogous licensor in a
strongly protected market. By contrast, pirates invest in advertising roughly 1/8 of the
IPR holder, and charge approximately half of its price.
2.4.2 Comparative Statics
In this section we study the e¤ect of parametric changes on the returns drawn from the
di¤erent strategies in a weak IPR framework. Using the envelope theorem for di¤erential
games, we compute the impact of parameter change on the prots hlic, 
l
lic, 
h
piracy,
cpiracy and the relative advantage of licensing for IPR holder 
h =
 
hlic   hpiracy

and
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for pirates l =
 
llic   cpiracy

. Table 2 shows numerical values of partial derivatives of
the prot functions, @h (0) =@i; and @l (0) =@i for the di¤erent parameters in the
model; that is how sensitivethe cumulative prots are to changes in the value of the
parameters of the model considering a licensed and unlicensed market.
Table 2: Comparative statics for licensing and piracy strategies in the weak IPR
framework

@hlic
@
(108) @llic
@
(108) @hpiracy
@
(108) @cpiracy
@
(108) @h
@
(108) @l
@
(108)
a 0:4661  0:3264 0:1048 0:0444 0:3613  0:3708
u 0:0746  0:0616 0:0275 0:0094 0:0471  0:071
M 0:000022 0:0000049
Mh 0:000085  0:0062  0:000063 0:0062049
M c  0:000018 0:000042 0:00004  0:0000371
m  0:5842  0:6066 1:9415  0:6619  2:5257 0:0553
p 0:00052 0:0006  0:0527 0 0:0532 0:0006
pc 0 0 0:0244 0:00054  0:0244  0:00054
b 0:2521  0:2131 0:0775 0:0311 0:1746  0:2442
kh  2:0407 2:0308  0:4457  0:1419  1:595 2:1727
i  3:834  0:7721  2:1205  1:0592  1:7135 0:2871
r 3:3085 0:9313  218:26 1:0451 221:5685  0:1138
s 0:2506  0:1937 0:0691 0:0213 0:1815  0:215
d  0:4060  0:6755 2:0384 0:4557  2:4444  1:1312
g 0:0915  0:0754 0:0253 0:0087 0:0622  0:0841
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
@hlic
@
(108) @llic
@
(108) @hpiracy
@
(108) @cpiracy
@
(108) @h
@
(108) @l
@
(108)
  0:1468 0:3205 0:0478 0:0666  0:1946 0:2539
  0:0400 0:0593 0:0091 0:0202  0:0491 0:0391
  0:0489 0:0726 0:0083 0:0185  0:0572 0:0541
  0:4803  0:3269 0:3613 1:9359  0:8416  2:2628
  0:7131  0:7767 12:9447  1:8911  13:6578 1:1144
  0:1473 0:2510 0:0281 0:0584  0:1754 0:1926
  0:1497 0:2350 0:0468 0:0426  0:1965 0:1924
kl 1:9515  2:2347  0:0387  0:2753 1:9902  1:9594
  0:1407 0:2770 0:0381 0:0567  0:1788 0:2203
 @
@
hlic (108) @
l
lic
@
(108) @hpiracy
@
(108) @cpiracy
@
(108) @h
@
(108) @l
@
(108)
z1 0:00024 0:000069 0:00013 0:00013 0:00011  0:000061
z2 0:000088 0:000063 0:000079 0:000082 0:000009  0:000019
z3 0:000001  0:00004 0:000041 0:000041  0:00004  0:000081
z4  0:0064 0:0093  0:0031  0:0031  0:0033 0:0124
z5  1177:53 1316:51 0 0  1177:53 1316:51
z6  36:39 37:54 0 0  36:39 37:54
r 0:00062  0:00062 0 0 0:00062  0:00062
f 0:00002  0:00002 0 0 0:00002  0:00002
L 0:0004  0:0006 0:00023 0:00023 0:00017  0:00083
In the context of weak IPR markets, licensing is the recommendable strategy for the
IPR holder because an increase of the pirates di¤usion does not imply an increase of its
prots (as pirates do not pay licensing fees). Similar to the case of strong IPR markets,
increasing the speed of licensee companies di¤usion (larger z1,z2,z3, and smaller z4,z5,z6,)
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and the market potential of licensees L makes licensing more attractive strategy.
If we keep M constant, and increase Mh whereas decreasing M c we can consider the
marginal change in the licensing advantage for IPR holder
 
@h=@Mh   @h=@M c =
 1:03  10 4 < 0; and also the marginal change in the licensing advantage for pirates 
@l=@Mh   @l=@M c = 6:242  10 3 > 0: When the IPR increases its share of the
total market potential with respect to the pirates, then licensing is less (more) attractive
for the licensor (pirates).
Table 2 also shows that @h /@ and @l /@ generally take values of opposite signs
with the exception of those related to prices. This result implies that the more desirable
licensing is for the IPR holder, the less willing the pirates are to accept the licensing
contract. And vice versa - when a parametric change makes licensing more attractive for
the pirates, the IPR holder is less willing to o¤er a licensing contract. Although we do not
completely rule out the possibility of licensing contract viability, these results show that
obviously licensing event is less common in weak IPR framework. This nding goes in
line with empirical evidence by Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006), Gambardella et al. (2007),
and Anand and Khanna (2000).
Previous research suggests that piracy can be benecial for an IPR holder, since
pirates accelerate di¤usion via word-of-mouth (see Givon et al. 1995, and Givon et al.
1997). We also found some interesting insights studying the nancial loss of the IPR
holder due to piracy, that is the di¤erence between the partial derivatives of prots of
the IPR holder in a monopolistic scenario (see @hmon /@ in Table 1) and those when
pirates are present (see @hpiracy /@ in Table 2). The lower the coe¢ cient of innovation
(parameter a) is, the lower the IPR holders nancial loss is caused by the piracy. In other
words, when the innovation parameter of the IPR holder is very small, the IPR holder
could be better o¤ tolerating some piracy. This goes in line with the results of Prasad
and Mahajan (2003), who nd that the lower the coe¢ cient of innovation, the higher is
the optimal tolerance level of piracy. Also, the higher the word of mouth parameter u
is, the more willing the IPR holder is to be in a monopolist position. This is because
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for a high u the IPR holder has su¢ cient word of mouth and it is less willing to tolerate
pirates (Prasad and Mahajan, 2003, nd that piracy toleration is lower when word of
mouth coe¢ cient is either very small or very large). Prasad and Mahajan (2003) also
nd a minor e¤ect of discount rate on piracy tolerance. By contrast, our results suggest
that the higher the discount rate i is, the smaller the IPR holders nancial loss is due
to the piracy. This result is reasonable, since when the discount rate is higher, faster
di¤usion of sales becomes more crucial for the IPR holder. Thus, the IPR holder may
even prefer pirates to have some part of the total market potential, given that pirates
speed up the di¤usion.
2.5 Empirical Application
This section presents an empirical application of the proposed licensing model to incan-
descent light bulbs industry in the United Kingdom (UK). Light bulb industry emerged
in the end of 19th century. After a number of years cooperating through prices and patent
licensing, in 1925 the world leading lamp manufacturers negotiated the General Patent
and Business Development Agreement (also known as the Phoebus Agreement after
the administrative o¢ ce S.A. Phoebus located in Geneva) originally set up to 1955,
but broken to an end by the second world war. The Phoebus Agreement divided the
world markets, giving to each party the right to the same annual proportion of the total
business in each territory as they had in 1924, and set product standards. The Electric
Lamp ManufacturersAssociation (E.L.M.A.) got the control for lamp manufacturing in
the UK. (E.L.M.A. included British Thomson-Houston Co. Ltd., Edison Swan Electric
Co. Ltd., Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Co. Ltd., General Electric Co. Ltd., Philips
Electrical Ltd., Stella Lamp Co. Ltd., Cryselco Ltd., Siemens Electric Lamps & Supplies
Ltd., Crompton Parkinson Ltd., British Electric Lamps Ltd., and Aurora Lamps Ltd.)
In 1937 the monopolist consortium E.L.M.A granted a non-exclusive non-transferable
license to produce and sell electric lamps in the UK to British Luma Co-operative Electric
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Lamp Society Ltd. (henceforth British Luma), a cooperative of small UK manufacturers.
The output sold by British Luma was slightly larger than the sum of productions of the
two smallest companies in E.L.M.A. In this section we study the E.L.M.A. and British
Luma agreement using the licensing model to obtain structural explanations for their
decision and compute the optimal patterns for their prots and sales. We use sales data
from the UK Monopolies Commission Report on the Supply of Electric Lamps. The
yearly lamp production data extends from 1924 till 1950. The licensing contract also
species the number of lamp units that the Licensee is permitted to sell or otherwise
dispose of for the duration of the License from 1937 till 1947. The di¤erence between
total lamp production and Licensees sales is recorded as the Licensor annual sales. We
use linear interpolation to obtain data for the missing observations. For this particular
case, we consider that the decision problems faced by Licensor and the Licensee at the
year of 1937 are given by the following structure:
 The licensee British Luma solves the problem
maxllic =
R1
0
e it
  
plt   c

(1  r)N lt

dt
s.t. (2:8); (2:9);
 The licensor E.L.M.A. solves the problem
maxhlic =
R1
0
e it
  
pht   c

Nht +
 
plt   c

rN lt

dt
s.t. (2:8); (2:9)
where

N
h
t =

a+ u

Nht
Mh
+
N lt
M l
 
Mh  Nht
 h
1 m  ertp  pht 2 + d  ertp  plt2i ;
(2.8)
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and

N
l
t =

+ 

Nht
Mh
+
N lt
M l
 
M l  N lt
 h
1 + 
 
ertp  pht
2     ertp  plt2i
(2.9)
and Nh0 = N1937; N
l
0 = 0.
Note that, by the licensing contract, the Licensee pays a 3% royalty of the net selling
price to the licensor, i.e. r = 0:03. By the contract the licensees should not supply
lamps which are di¤erent in size characteristics from those sold by the Licensor. Thus,
we assume that the word of mouth e¤ects of licensor and licensee sales are the same.
Furthermore, the growth equation for licensees number is absent from the system of
state equations as there is only one licensee company throughout the licensing period.
We did not have data on advertising, and therefore it was not included in the model.
Two di¤erent market potentials were considered, similar to the weak IPR framework, as
the agreement restricted the market potential for British Luma.
Regarding of the pricing of the electrical bulbs, by the licensing contract, British Luma
does not take decision over the prices. By contrast, we consider how price competition
a¤ects the sales di¤usion paths. We set the market potentials as Mh = 3000  105 and
M l = 40  105, and obtain the least squares estimators of the coe¢ cients of innovation
and imitation: a = 0:012, u = 0:061,  =  0:15,  = 0:32, m = 3:3;  = 24:15, with
d = 1 and  = 10. Using the estimated parameter values, a discount factor i = 0:08, an
average measure of desirable price p = 0:05$ for a unit of bulb, and a unit cost of 0:03$;
we solve numerically the dynamic game between the Licensor and the Licensee. The
optimal discounted lifetime prots for E.L.M.A and British Luma are 1:26  108$ and
8:45105$ , respectively. Figure 6 depicts the optimal sales path for both companies over
the considered time period, as well as the empirical data. Note that between 1939 and
1945 the second world war damaged European lamp sales even for the posterior years,
and Phoebus Agreement was ended by that time.
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Figure 6. Sales of E.L.M.A. and British Luma
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A manager of a company which faces a decision to license (or alternatively, to become
a licensee) could perform a similar analysis to get a measure of total lifetime prots from
licensing and optimal product sales path. This would help to make licensing decisions.
Also, by possessing external measures of sales sensitivity to marketing mix variables the
manager could use the model to deduce optimal marketing mix decisions. Importantly,
the analysis takes into account the word of mouth acceleration e¤ect of the licensee sales
on sales growth of the licensor and vice versa.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper considers the use of licenses as a strategy to speed up the sales di¤usion
process of new products, commercializing the innovation and simultaneously licensing
the product technology to one or more other rms. Our ndings show that licensing is a
benecial strategy for the innovator who renounces to monopolistic power derived from
the exclusivity, but draws cash-ow from royalties and exploits the advertising investment
and positive word-of-mouth e¤ects by licensees. The license agreement is feasible in
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markets with strong IPR, as licensor and licensee are beneted from the agreement. We
compare this result with a weak IPR context where piracy speeds up the product di¤usion
but this does not compensate the IPR holder for the sales loss e¤ect who would prefer to
license in order to get some royalties. However, pirates do not generally nd the licensing
agreement interesting.
Managerial Implications: Radical product innovations considerably vary in their
take-o¤ times and the speed of di¤usion. Most managers favor rapid acceleration of sales
di¤usion in order to receive quicker returns. As far as we know, this is the rst paper that
analyzes licensing as a strategy to accelerate the di¤usion of radical product innovation in
di¤erent IPR frameworks. We showed that licensing would provide considerable benets
to a rm for a certain set of parameter values, and analyzed the robustness of this property
using comparative statics. Thus, a manager could conduct a similar analysis to decide
for the benets of product licensing and to have optimal marketing mix and licensing
decisions over time. The empirical application illustrates how the proposed model can be
adapted to di¤erent data sets. Note also that the model for weak IPR could be applied
to explain the viability of some franchise agreements.
Limitation and Future Research: The proposed modeling approach leaves open
many possibilities for future research. First, in the dynamic game solution we assume
open-loop information structure, but there are other alternatives. Future work could
extend the analysis to industries with more information using a closed loop or a Stack-
elberg equilibrium, although the computational task to solve these models is formidable.
Second, we assume a model specication that builds upon the new product di¤usion liter-
ature. Although the specication is well grounded, we consider that empirical testing of
the model would be important. Unfortunately, the richness of the required data makes it
somehow di¢ cult, particularly for pirates in the case of weak IPR. To respond this type
of challenge, researchers have suggested to use experimental designs as well as computer
based simulations (e.g. Montaguti et al. 2002). We have mostly followed the second
strategy. The comparative static analysis yields several hypotheses, some of which are
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testable. We leave this for further research.
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2.8 Appendix
Consider N players each of them setting a set of control variables uit; a deterministic
dynamic system

xt = g (xt; ut; t) ; x (0) = x0 with ut = (u1t; :::; uNt). In a standard
di¤erential game, each player maximizes the prots i =
R1
0
Gi (ut; xt; t) dt subject to a
dynamic system constraints, where Gi and g are continuously di¤erentiable functions. In
an (open-loop) Nash equilibrium (x; u)
i (x; u1; :::; u

N) = max
ui;x
i
 
x; u1; :::; u

i 1; ui; u

i+1; :::; u

N

; (2.10)
subject to the dynamic system constraint, for i = 1; ::::; N: The open-loop Nash equilib-
rium fx; u1; :::; uNg satises the rst order conditions:
@H i
@uit
= 0;
@H i
@it
=

xt; _it =  @H
i
@xt
; (2.11)
for i = 1; ::::; N , whereH i (xt; u1t; :::uNt; t) = Gi (xt; u1t; :::uNt; t)+it g (xt; u1t; :::uNt; t) is
the Hamiltonian of player i. By contrast, the closed-loop Nash (i.e. feedback) equilibrium
(x; u) is dened when (2.10) conditions are redened in terms of the optimal response
by other players to the state of the system, i.e.
i (x; u1 ; :::; u

N ) = max
ui;x
i
 
x; u1 (x) ; :::; u

i 1 (x) ; ui; u

i+1 (x) ; :::; u

N (x)

;
subject to the dynamic system constraint, for i = 1; ::::; N: The closed-loop Nash equi-
librium satises the HJB rst order conditions:
@H i
@uit
= 0;
@H i
@it
=

xt; _it =  @H
i
@xt
 P
j 6=i
@H i
@ujt
@ujt
@xt
; (2.12)
for i = 1; ::::; N , where the terms f@ujt=@xtgj 6=i means that the i th player anticipates the
competitorsreaction to changes in the state variable when the player sets its policy, and
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these reactions are respectively weighted by their impact in the i-th player Hamiltonian
@H i=@ujt. When @ujt=@xt = 0 or @H i=@ujt = 0 for all pairs i 6= j; then the open-loop and
the closed-loop equilibrium are identical. Once the solution is computed we can evaluate
the optimal values i for each player at equilibrium. Finally, a Stackelberg di¤erential
game equilibrium assumes asymmetric information, such that informed leaders behave
as in the closed-loop equilibrium, and the ignorant followers behave as in an open-loop
equilibrium. For a detailed introduction to optimal control and di¤erential games, see
e.g. Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987).
Regarding the comparative statics, let us assume that the state and prot func-
tions depend upon certain parameters  2   RK where  is an open set, so that
g (xt; ut; t) and Gi (ut; xt; t) are smooth functions on : Then the envelope theorem for
di¤erential games states that,
@i
@

=0
=
Z 1
0
"
@H i (xt; ut; t)
@
+
P
j 6=i
@H i (xt; ut; t)
@ujt
@ujt
@
#
=0
dt
and this result is valid for both, open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium. A simple proof
can be found, e.g., in LaFrance et al. (1991) for the case when N = 1, and in Caputo
(2007) for di¤erential games.
Next we provide the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) rst order conditions for the
optimal policies based on Strategy 1 and Strategy 2 in markets with strong IPR.
Proposition 1 The optimal pricing and advertising decisions for a monopolistic IPR
holder (Strategy 1) are given by:
pht = e
rtp+
e itNht
ht 2m

a+u
Nht
M

(M Nht ) khNht
 ;
Aht = be
itht
h
a+ u
Nht
M
  
M  Nht
  khNht i ;
50
where Nht ; 
h
t are the solution to the Boundary Value Problem (BVP) dened by
_Nht =
h
a+ u
Nht
M
  
M  Nht
  khNht i 1 + b lnAht  m  ertp  pht 2
_
h
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
 ht

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 
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M

  kh

1 + b lnAht  m
 
eitp  pht
2
with Nh0 = 0, limt!1 
h
tN
h
t = 0.
Proof. (Proposition 1)
We dene the HJB equation,
Hhmon
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Nht ; p
h
t ; A
h
t ; t

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h
t ; N
h
t ; t
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rst condition:
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The second condition leads to:
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From the third and fourth conditions:
_Nht =

a+ u
Nht
M
 
M  Nht
  khNht 1 + b lnAht  m  ertp  pht 2
_
h
t =  e it
 
pht   cht

 ht

u
M
 
M  Nht
  a+ uNht
M

  kh

1 + b lnAht  m
 
eitp  pht
2

The solution satises a BVP, with initial conditions and terminal conditions limt!1 
h
tN
h
t =
0 (which are known as transversality conditions). It can be solved numerically with a
Galerkin-Collocation method setting hTN
h
T = 0 for a large T: For details see Esteban-
Bravo and Vidal-Sanz, (2007).
Proposition 2 The open-loop Nash equilibrium pricing and advertising decisions when
the license (Strategy 2) is implemented, are given by:
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rtp+ e itN lt
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and the variables Nht ; N
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and the co-state equations for the IPR holder
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with initial values Nh0 = N
l
0 = l0 = 0; and terminal conditions limt!1 
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The proof of Proposition 2 is similar to that of Proposition 1. Next, we provide the
rst order conditions for the optimal policies under piracy, based on Strategy 3.
Proposition 3 If an IPR holder faces piracy competition (Strategy 3), the open-loop
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Nash equilibrium pricing and advertising decisions are given by:
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h
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1t; 
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2t; 
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The proof of Proposition 3 is similar to that of Proposition 1.
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Chapter 3
Riding Successive Product Di¤usion
Waves. Building a Tsunami via
UpgradeRebate Programs
3.1 Introduction
In this paper we study how to manage sales of durable new products under successive
generation di¤usion waves with trade-in rebates. If the durability of the product is large
relative to the introduction times of successive generations, they cannibalize each other
as rms often sell inventory of old generation goods which were leftover from previous
periods simultaneously with newer ones. The older generations are often perceived to be
of lower quality, and rms usually sell it at a reduced price (Koenigsberg and Ferguson,
2007). Some potential customers from the old generation can upgrade to new one, but
others could buy the old one at a lower price, and this can a¤ect a large share of cus-
tomers. The innovation di¤usion literature has suggested that fear of obsolescence may
cause some consumers to refuse to buy technological products from the rst generations
(Cohen et al. 1996; Dhebar 1996; Venkatesh and Brown 2001), waiting for new products
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and accumulate old potential buyers for new generations (Putsis 1993). Second hand
markets for used durable goods reduce consumers threat of leapfrogging, but on the
other hand generate additional competition from old products that reenter the market
(Desai, Koenigsberg, and Purohit, 2007). Some companies buy-back in second-hand mar-
kets and remanufacture the product gaining a competitive advantage (Heese et al. 2005).
UpgradeRebates can also be used to disable second-hand market for the old versions,
using buybacks to retire the old units from the market (see Levinthal and Purohit, 1989).
Managing di¤usion waves for successive product generations implies that marketing
managers should try to dissuade some customers to jump across successive generation
waves optimally for the company prots. In addition, companies should consider some
strategy to lessen the regret of consumers who have bought old-generation products and
persuade them to upgrade to new generations in future (Dhebar 1996). In this paper we
discuss how UpgradeRebates (also known as trade-in rebates) can be used to reintegrate
owners of old versions of the product to the market and therefore increase current sales.
An upgrade-rebate program allows customers who own an old generation version of the
product to trade it in for a product belonging to a later generation at a discounted price.
This is also an instrument to make a credible threat that if the consumers do not buy
the rst generation product, they will face a relatively higher price for the new product
in subsequent generations.
Upgrade-rebates are implemented by companies in di¤erent industries such as soft-
ware, electrical appliances, cars, etc. For instance, currently Hewlett-Packard allows its
customers to trade-in di¤erent types of products and brands for its new HP products1.
Xerox provides up to $600 rebate to trade in old product of own and competitive brands
for its new product models2. Similar strategies are also implemented by Motorola and
Sony, among others. Governments often adopt trade-in strategies. Some examples are
the Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS) program launched out by the US Congress
1http://www.hp.com/united-states/tradein/home_ash.html
2http://xerox.tradeups.com/Customers/17/Default.aspx
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to increase automotive sales and aid the environment and the Home Renovation Rebate
in Canada in the form of a tax credit.
Trade-ins can be considered as a strategic link between reverse and direct channels
management, where the customer bears part of the reverse-logistics and the returned
product is not remarketed (see Ray, Boyaci and Aras, 2005). Upgrade-rebates have been
considered from a pricing perspective. Notice that new customers pay more than those
who upgrade an old product, and these rebates can be thought of as a price discrimination
based on consumerspurchase history. This has been studied by Lee and Lee (1998),
Levinthal and Purohit (1989) in second hand markets and Fudenberg and Tirole (1998)
in a more general setup. Ackere and Reyniers (1995) consider quasidurable goods. But
in these models the results depend heavily on parametric assumptions, generally in a
two-period framework. The rich dynamic perspective, where upgrade-rebates are used
to control the whole di¤usion of successive generations, is hitherto unexplored. In this
paper we study this problem in a context without a second-hand market, and compute
the optimal rebates policy to ride the successive di¤usion waves.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is the following. In the next section
we present a general model of successive product generations di¤usion, the inclusion of
the upgrade-rebate program into the benchmark model, and the optimal solution of the
problem. In Section 3 we provide some simulations with numerical solutions and results.
In Section 4 we provide an empirical application of the upgrade-rebate model to the
automobile industry in Spain. Finally, we conclude the paper with general discussion,
pointing out some limitations and suggestions for future research.
3.2 A Successive Generations Di¤usion Model
In this section we present a di¤usion model for successive product generations. We build
up on previous work on successive generation models, such as Norton and Bass (1987,
1992), Mahajan and Muller (1996), and Stremersch, Muller and Peres (2010). We rst
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introduce the benchmark model without upgrade-rebates, and then we discuss how the
model can accommodate this type of promotion.
3.2.1 The Benchmark Model
Let us consider K product generations, the i   th one is introduced at time  i with
a market potential mi. After the entry of generation i, the older generations j, where
j < i, can still continue to acquire some customers from mj;mj 1; mj 2; :::;m1; but more
importantly, the new generation attracts natural upgraders from the older generations
mi 1;mi 2; :::m1. The expression of natural upgraders is used to point out that they are
not attracted by a promotion, but are those which would have bought the old generation
had the new generation(s) not been introduced. The model allows leapfrogging (i.e.
upgrading beyond the subsequent generation) and the specication can be easily adapted
to durable and non durable products. In particular, for non-durable products we consider
sales dened as0BBBBBB@
S1 (t)
S2 (t)
...
SK (t)
1CCCCCCA =
0BBBBBB@
f11 (t) 0 : : : 0
f12 (t) f22 (t) : : : 0
...
...
. . .
...
f1K (t) f2K (t) : : : fKK (t)
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
m1
m2
...
mK
1CCCCCCA,
S (t) = f (t)0 m (3.1)
where m = (m1; :::;mK)
0 , and f (t) is a di¤usion matrix with generic element fij (t) 2
(0; 1) describing the proportion of potential customers from mi purchasing product from
generation j at time t: Obviously fii (t) is the net penetration of generation mi at time
t removing the upgraders. The transposed di¤usion matrix f (t)0 is lower triangular to
ensure that old generation products do not attract customers from the new generations,
and the elements of each column of f (t)0 sum less than one (i.e.,
PK
j=i fij (t)  1 for
all i = 1:::K), to ensure that the summation of sales drawn from potential customers of
generation i do not exceed the potential market ceilingmi: It implies that
PK
j=i

f ij (t)  0
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for all i = 1:::K:
This is a exible structure, and several specications can be considered for

f ij. In
particular, we consider that the departing rate from potential customers of generation i
to purchase product generation j is given by

f ij =
8<:
 
pij + q
0
ijfj (t)
 
1 PKl=i fil (t) ; fij ( j) = 0; j  i
0 j < i
(3.2)
where fj (t) = (f1j (t) ; : : : ; fjj (t) ; 0; : : : ; 0)
0 is the column j of matrix f (t) and qij is a
vector with all the coe¢ cients equal to zero after row j; meaning that the upgrading from
i to j is accelerated when fjj is high and when more people upgrade from old generations
to j: The

1 PKl=i fil (t) factor ensures that the columns of f (t)0 total at most 1 at
any time. Notice that we can consider more complex structures for defections in this
market, e.g. considering a generation 0, with S0 (t) the number of defections and a row
fj0 (t) in f (t)
0 accounting for the attractions from all generations to this event.
The previous model is appropriated for non-durable products so that the adopters
f (t)0m at time t are the current sales (except for the defections, if they had been con-
sidered). If instead of non-durables we model the di¤usion of durable products, we can
simply replace (3.1) by the expression
S (t) =

f (t)0m: (3.3)
meaning that sales at time t are given by the change in penetration rates weighted by
the market potentials. Notice that the vector f (t)0 1 is the penetration percentage of
each generation at time t: In both cases, durables and non-durables, we can introduce
controls on the di¤usion matrix f (t) analogously to the Horsky and Simon (1983) model,
or multiplicatively when these controls also a¤ect the market potentials m. Note also
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that semi-durables could be handled in the benchmark setting
S (t) =

f (t)0m+
Z t
0

f (s)0m (t  s) ds
where () = dig fi ()g is a diagonal matrix with the probabilities of a product of
generation i perishing after  periods.
3.2.2 The Model With an UpgradeRebate Program
Let us dene r(t) as the cumulative UpgradeRebate matrix, i.e. the element rij (t) 2
(0; 1) is the fraction of individuals owning a product from generation i who have upgraded
it to a product of generation j by time t. The fraction of individuals upgrading at time t
is

r (t) : Theis matrix is lower triangular, as not all types of upgrades are pursued by the
company, for example
r (t)0 =
0BBBBBB@
0 0 : : : 0
r12 (t) 0 : : : 0
...
...
. . .
...
r1K (t) r2K (t) : : : 0
1CCCCCCA :
if the company just allows changes from old generation purchases to new generations
and not vice versa. In practice, this matrix is often spare since just a few elements are
non-zero as only upgrades between consecutive generations are permitted, but allowing
most of the old trade-up pair combinations the optimization analysis is more exible.
Similar to the benchmark model, the elements of each column of r (t) sum at most one
(i.e.,
PK
j=i+1 rij (t)  1 for all i = 1:::K), to ensure that the summation of upgraders from
generation i to other generations does not exceed one, this implies that
PK
j=i+1

rij (t)  0
for i = 1:::K: Once again this is a exible structure, and several specications can be
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considered for

rij. In particular, we can consider that for j > i

rij (t) =
 
ij + 
0
ijrj (t)
 
1 PKl=i+1 ril (t)ijDij (t)
rij ( j) = 0:
and

rij (t) = 0 for i  j, where rj (t) =
 
r1j (t) ; : : : ; r(j 1)j (t) ; 0; : : : ; 0
0
is the column
j of matrix r (t) ; and Dij (t)  0 are rebates obtained on the purchase of j when the
product i is returned.
The di¤usion f (t) of the di¤erent generations will be a¤ected by the upgrades r (t).
The upgraderebate program also provides a response to the consumers threat of leapfrog-
ging, and the customers who use a rebate spread word-of-mouth in a di¤erent way than
those who do not upgrade through this promotion. In particular we replace (3.2) by,

f ij =
 
pij + q
0
ijfj (t) + rj (t)
0 f (t) bij
 
1 PKl=i fil (t) (1  ijPj (t)) ;
for j  i and

f ij = 0 when j < i; with fij ( j) = 0; where qij is a column vector with
all the coe¢ cients equal to zero after row j; Pj (t) are prices of generation j, and bij is a
column vector with zero elements after j. For simplicity, we assume multiplicative linear
prices (e.g. Dockner and Jorgensen 1988).
Next we discuss the sales behavior. Recall that f (t)0m is the vector of cumulated
sales from the di¤erent generations up to time t. The cumulative sales caused by the
UpgradeRebate Program at time t are (as a column including all generation):
r (t)0 f (t)0m =
Z t
0


r (s)0 f (s)0m+ r (s)0

f (s)0m

ds
=
Z t
0

f (s)

r (s) +

f (s) r (s)
0
mds;
(the proof is immediate as
R t
0

f (s)

r (s)
0
mds = (f (t) r (t))0m   R t
0
 
f (s) r (s)
0
mds
integrating by parts). Therefore, the instantaneous UpgradeRebate sales at time t is
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the derivative of r (t)0 f (t)0m which is equal to

f (t)

r (t) +

f (t) r (t)
0
m; i.e. those
types of current sales are decomposed as the sum of sales to old buyers who upgrade
now

r (t)0 f (t)0m, and sales of current buyers of old versions who immediately choose
to upgrade r(t)0

f (t)0m. In order to ban immediate upgrades some companies could
consider a constrained rebate structured with r(t) orthogonal to

f (t), but this could be
suboptimal and we will not impose it in our basic structure.
Finally, the total sales at time t in all product generations are the sum of regular sales
of the durable products as in (3.3), and the second summand has sales drawn from the
UpgradeRebate promotion
S (t) =

f (t)0m+

f (t)

r (t) +

f (t) r (t)
0
m
The company prots at time t are
(t) = m0
 
f (t) + f (t)

r (t) +

f (t) r (t)

(P (t)  c (t))
 m0

f (t)D (t)

r (t)+

f (t)D (t) r (t)

1;
where D (t) is the rebates matrix and (P (t)  c (t)) is a vector with the unit margins for
each generation and 1 is a vector of ones.
3.2.3 The Optimal Behavior
Assuming a durable-goods monopolist who controls the di¤usion of all generations, the
company prots are obtained by maximizing:
 =
Z 1
0
e rt(t) dt
=
Z 1
0
e rt

m0
 
f (t)+f (t)

r (t)+

f (t) r (t)

(P (t)  c (t))
  m0

f (t)D (t)

r (t)+

f (t)D (t) r (t)

1

dt;
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subject to the state equations and the initial values fij ( j) = rij ( j) = 0 for each i  j.
In order to write the rst-order conditions of the optimal control problem, it is con-
venient to write all the state variables as vectors instead of matrices. We dene

f;

rt;
ft; rt; Dt the half-vectorization3 of matrices

f (t) ;

r (t) ; f (t) ; r (t) ; D (t), respectively;
introducing a compact notation for prots and state equations,
t = (ft; rt; Pt; Dt)

ft =  (ft; rt; Pt) ;

rt =  (ft; rt; Dt) :
Let the Hamiltonian function H of the optimal control be given by:
Ht (ft; rt; Pt; Dt; t; t) =  (ft; rt; Pt; Dt) + t   (ft; rt; Pt) + t   (ft; rt; Dt) ;
where t and t be the multiplier vectors associated with the state variables ft and rt,
respectively. The maximum principle conditions are (in compact notation)
@Ht
@Dt
= 0; @Ht
@Pt
= 0 for any i < j;
_t =  @Ht@ft ; for any i  j;
_t =  @Ht@rt for any i < j;
together with initial conditions at introduction times  i, and transversality conditions
of t; t tending to zero (numerically we equalize them to zero for large t). Also, we
require that the marginal valuation of the state variable(s) be the same evaluated before
and after each  j (Amit, 1986; Kamien and Schwartz, 1991). This is a boundary value
di¤erential equation system, that must be particularized for each specic problem. In the
3The vectorization of an n m matrix A, denoted by vec (A), is the nm  1 column vector obtain
by stacking the columns of the matrix A on top of one another proceeding from column 1 to column m.
The half-vectorization vech(A) of a n  n matrix A is the n(n + 1)=2  1 column vector obtained by
vectorizing only the lower triangular part of A, i.e. staking the low-triangle part of the columns on top
of one another from column 1 to m.
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next sections we present some general examples and compute the numerical solutions.
3.3 Numerical Results
In order to analyze the e¤ect of upgrade-rebate strategy on a rms prots and sales,
we study a monopolistic rm which manages successive product di¤usion waves. As
analytical solutions of the problems are not feasible, we solve the optimal problems
numerically. We introduce several cases with increasing di¢ culty. For all the examples
considered, we compare the numerical results of upgrade-rebate implementation with the
benchmark case when the rm does not carry out the strategy.
3.3.1 Managing Two Generations
First we study the optimal behavior of the rm which manages the di¤usion of two
product generations assuming that the monopolistic rm takes the prices of the products
as given. Next, relaxing this assumption, we examine a rm which optimally controls
for prices and analyze the e¤ect of upgrade-rebate strategy on rm prots and product
di¤usion waves. Finally, we discuss the scenario, when the rm provides the second
generation product absolutely for free to the upgraders.
Two generations example with exogenous prices
We rst present a simple case of a monopolistic rm which manages two waves of suc-
cessive product generations. We assume that prices of the product generations are given
exogenously. Before the second generation is introduced, i.e.  1 < t <  2 , the state
equation system is the following:
8<:

f 11 = (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)) (1  11P1 (t)) ;

f 12 = 0;

f 22 = 0;

r12 = 0:
(3.4)
After the introduction of the second generation,  2 < t < T , the system of state
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equations turns to:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:

f 11 = (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) (1  11P1 (t)) ;

f 12 = (p12 + q
1
12f12 (t) + q
1
22f22 (t) + b
1
12r12 (t) f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) (1  12P2 (t))

f 22 = (p22 + q
2
12f12 (t) + q
2
22f22 (t) + b
2
12r12 (t) f11 (t)) (1  f22 (t)) (1  22P2 (t))

r12 = (12 + 12r12 (t)) (1  r12 (t))12D12 (t) :
(3.5)
The company prots are given by
 =
Z 1
0
e rt(t) dt =
Z 2
1
e rt1 (t) dt+
Z 1
2
e rt2 (t) dt;
1 (t) =

f 11m1 (P1 (t)  c1 (t))
2 (t) =

1 (t) +
 
f 12m1 +

f 22m2 + f11m1

r12 +

f 11m1r12

(P2 (t)  c2 (t))
 

f11m1

r12 +

f 11m1r12

D12 (t)

:
The Hamiltonian conditions are given in Appendix A1. The system of resulting dif-
ferential equations cannot be solved analytically. We compute the numerical solution
for the following values of the parameters. We assume arbitrary total market sizes of
m1 = 2000 and m2 = 3000 for the rst and the second generation products, respec-
tively. We take the following values for the coe¢ cients of innovation: p11 = 0:003,
p12 = 0:001, and p22 = 0:003; and coe¢ cients of imitation: q11 = 0:05, q112 = q
2
12 = 0:05,
and q122 = q
2
22 = 0:05. To capture the e¤ect of price, we initially set 11 = 0:002,
12 = 0:002, 22 = 0:002. We assume that b112 = b
2
12 = 0:07, which is the parameter
showing how the product di¤usion is a¤ected by the proportion of upgraders through the
rebate program. For the upgraders di¤usion equation we set the parameters of innovation
and imitation as 12 = 0:03 and 12 = 0:3, respectively; and for the parameter of the
sensitivity to the rebate discounts as 12 = 0:0005. We also set P1 = 300, P2 = 300,
and c1 = 100, c2 = 100, i.e. the unit price and cost parameters for the rst and second
generation products. The discount rate is set to r = 0:05. We assume that the second
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generation is introduced at  2 = 65 and compute the solution for a large time length
(T = 300). The results are relatively robust when we tried other parametric values in
the same ranges.
We insert the optimality conditions of the rebate strategy into eight di¤erential equa-
tions (four equations of state variables given by equations (3.4) and (3.5), and four
equations of multipliers dened by (3.6) and (3.7)-(3.10) dened before and after the
introduction time of the second generation  2, respectively). We end up with a system
of 8 di¤erential equations with 8 unknowns, with 4 initial conditions, 4 boundary con-
ditions, as well as continuity conditions of the state variables and the multipliers at  2.
We solve the resulting BVP numerically, using the Galerkin-Collocation method (for an
introduction see, for instance, Judd 1998).
Figure 1 shows the e¤ect of the upgrade-rebate program on the sales di¤usion for this
set of parameters. From Figure 1 panel (c), the net penetration of the second generation
product is signicantly accelerated. The upgrade-rebate program also speeds up the
natural upgrading process from generation 1 to generation 2 (Figure 1 panel (b)). The
implementation of the programwould result into a faster and eventually higher proportion
of adopters buying the second generation product, but who would have bought the older
generation had the second generation product not been introduced. On the other hand,
these positive e¤ects of the program on the sales di¤usion of the second generation
product are partially o¤set by a lower proportion of adopters of the rst generation
product (see Figure 1 panel (a)).
68
Figure 1. E¤ect of rebate program on di¤usion
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For this set of parameters, the optimal total discounted prot is  = 15369 for
the benchmark case and  = 16205 if the company implements the trade-in strategy.
Thus, the implementation of trade-in strategy increases the total discounted prots of
the company by nearly 5:44%.
Figure 2 shows the optimal rebate amounts over time. As it can be seen, the optimal
rebate strategy is to start at a somewhat high level and to decrease it gradually over
time. The comparison of the optimal rebate strategy with the price value of the second
generation reveals that initially for the company it is optimal to give the buyers of the rst
generation monetary incentives to buy the second generation product (i.e. D12 (t) > P2
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up to some t).
Figure 2. Optimal rebate amount
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Figure 3 shows the optimal current prots (panel a) and discounted prots (panel b).
Under both strategy scenarios (i.e. implementing or not upgrade-rebate policy) optimal
current prots increase over time but after some time decline becoming closer to zero.
However, when upgrade-rebate strategy is carried out, optimal prots peak earlier and
at a higher level. Not surprisingly, discounted prots asymptotically tend to zero.
Figure 3. Optimal current and dicsounted prots
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Two generation example with prices as controls
Next, we relax the assumption of exogenous prices and discuss a more realistic case of
two product generations, when the rm maximizes its life-time prots optimally choosing
prices and rebate amounts. We discuss the optimal conditions of the rms maximization
problem in the Appendix A2. We solved the system of di¤erential equations using the
Galerkin-Collocation method as in the previous case.
Figure 4. E¤ect of rebate program on di¤usion
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Figure 5. E¤ect of rebate program on optimal prices
0 100 200 300
240
260
280
300
320
340
360
(a) Time
P
ric
e 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
1
With rebates
Without rebates
50 100 150 200 250 300
150
200
250
300
350
400
(b) Time
P
ric
e 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
2
With rebates
Without rebates
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the e¤ect of the upgrade-rebate program on the di¤usion
of the fraction of buyers and the optimal prices. Comparing visually Figure 4 with the
case when the prices are given exogenously (Figure 1) we observe that the di¤usion
acceleration e¤ect of the program is less prominent. However, the implementation of the
program allows the company to charge higher prices for the second product generation.
On the other hand, the company charges lower prices for the rst product generation so
that to mitigate the deceleration e¤ect of the program on the fraction of buyers of the
rst generation product (see Figure 5).
Overall, for this set of parameters the optimal total discounted prot is  = 16120
for the benchmark case and  = 16820 if the company implements the trade-in strategy.
As expected, the values of optimal total discounted prots for both scenarios are higher
than the corresponding values when the prices are given exogenously. The implementa-
tion of trade-in strategy increases the total discounted prots of the company by nearly
4:34%. Interestingly, the percentage gain in prots is now less than that of the case when
the prices are exogenously given. The intuitive explanation is that by handling prices
the company has more degrees of freedom to accelerate the ows in-and-between both
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generations, so the e¤ect of an additional control (e.g., rebates) is smaller.
Two generation example, when returns-upgrades are for free
The results of the previous examples show that the upgrade-rebate program substan-
tially increases the prots of the rm. The program accelerates the di¤usion, but also
increases the total number of the buyers of the second generation product. Thus, it is
still questionable if the increase in prots of the rm is due to faster di¤usion of the sales
or merely to more buyers of the second generation product.
We explore this issue by considering a situation where the rm provides the upgraders
the product of the new generation for free. Providing free upgrading is suboptimal for
the rm. However, this allows us to see if the increase of prots is due to di¤usion
acceleration of the second generation, as the rm does not earn anything from those
customers who upgrade.
The rms optimization problem is similar to that given in the rst example with
exogenous prices with the exception that D12 = P2. We also abstract from the pricing
strategy of the rm, assuming the prices as given. Thus, the BVP for this scenario is
given as in (3.4)-(3.10), substituting for D12 by P2.
We compute the numerical solution using the same values for the parameters. Because
of space limitations, we do not provide the di¤usion paths of the fraction of buyers.
However, we report that the di¤usion acceleration e¤ect on the second generation product
is prominent. Obviously, the optimal life-time prots are lower for this suboptimal case
than in the rst example,  = 15371 for the benchmark case and  = 15902 when the
upgrade-rebate strategy is implemented. Thus, even though the company would not earn
anything from those customers who buy the rst generation product and then upgrade to
the second generation, it still faces a 3:45% increase in prots which is due to acceleration
e¤ect of the program.
73
3.3.2 Managing Three Generations
We also conduct a similar analysis for the case when the company manages di¤usion
waves of 3 generations of a product. We provide the representation of the optimal control
problem and its maximum principle conditions in the Appendix A3.
We solve numerically the system of di¤erential equations for similar values of parame-
ters. We set the market size of the third generation product as m3 = 3000. We take the
following values for the coe¢ cients of innovation: p11 = 0:002, p12 = 0:002, p13 = 0:002,
p22 = 0:002, p23 = 0:002, p33 = 0:004; and coe¢ cients of imitation: q11 = 0:03, q
j
12 = 0:03,
qj13 = 0:03, q
j
22 = 0:05, q
j
23 = 0:05, q
j
33 = 0:05. All the price sensitivity parameters are
set to ij = 0:002. We assume that b
j
13 = 0:07, b
j
23 = 0:07. For the upgraders di¤usion
equation we set the parameters as ij = 0:05, 
j
ij = 0:1, ij = 0:0005. Furthermore, the
unit price and cost parameters of the third generation are assumed to be equal to those
of the previous generations P3 = 300 and c3 = 100, respectively. We assume that the
second and the third generations are introduced at  2 = 90 and  3 = 160. The rest of the
parameters of the model are assumed to be the same as in the case of the two generations
examples.
For this set of parameters the optimal total discounted prot is  = 8509 for the
benchmark case and  = 8331 if the company implements the trade-in strategy. The
optimal discounted prots under the two scenarios are less than in the case of two gener-
ations as innovator and imitator coe¢ cients are smaller. The percentage gain in prots
is also less, mostly because the second and the third generations are introduced later
(at 90th and 160th period, respectively). Still, the implementation of trade-in strategy
increases the total discounted prots of the company by nearly 2:13%.
Figure 6 shows the e¤ect of the program on the di¤usion of the buyersproportions.
On the one hand, the trade-in strategy slows down the di¤usion of the proportion of the
buyers of the rst generation product (Figure 6 panel (a)). On the other hand, it speeds
up the di¤usion of the other proportions of the customers. However, this e¤ect is di¤erent
across the proportion of buyers of second and third generations. The second generations
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di¤usion is accelerated less as some fraction of customers of the second generation trade-
up for the third generation, making the opposite e¤ect on the acceleration of the second
generation. The upgrade-rebate program mostly a¤ects the proportions of buyers of the
third generation (f13, f23, f33).
Figure 6. E¤ect of rebate program on di¤usion
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3.4 Empirical Application
As mentioned in the Introduction, trade-in programs are implemented by companies, as
well as by governments. This section presents an empirical application of the upgrade-
rebate model to the automobile industry in Spain. In 1997 Spanish government launched
an upgrade-rebate program with indenite duration known as Plan Prever, endowing car
upgrades with a xed rebate of 480 euros (as a reduction in the new car registration tax)
provided that their old car is deregistered and scrapped. In this study, we used monthly
data from January 1970 till June 2000. The data set includes the number of Plan Prever
scrapped old cars, the number of sold cars, and the average unit prices. The raw data
were obtained from the Dirección General de Tráco (Spanish administration department
in charge of Motor Vehicles), Instituto de Estudios de Automoción (Institute for Research
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in the Automobile Industry of Spain, that is part of the National Carmakers Association
ANFAC), and Infoadex (a Spanish market research company, http://www.infoadex.es).
We compute a wholesale cars price index in Euros (1995 base). Since the data on scrapped
cars are aggregated for the cars of the same age, we make a simplifying assumption
that all the car models produced before 1997 are labelled as rst generations, and
those launched after the commence of the program as secondgeneration. Also, we set
the market potentials of the rst and the second generations as m1 = 40000 and
m2 = 3000 (in thousands), respectively which are reasonable assumptions validated by
the opinion of industry analysts.
The rst step is the model calibration. For these data, we compute f11, f12, and f22
as a fraction of cumulative monthly sales over the market potentials of both generations.
Using sales data of the rstgeneration from 1970 till 1997 and cumulative car sales at
the beginning of the period , we rst estimate p11, q11, and 11 in equation (3.4), including
an additional dummy variable to account for the recession years. In particular, in the
rstgeneration during the years 1970-1996, we consider the following model

f 11 = (p11 + q11 f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)) (1  11 P1 (t)) (1 + a RC (t)) ;
where RC is a dummy variable which takes value 1 in the recession years 1980; 1981;
1982; 1983; 1984; 1985 and 1993 and zero otherwise. The regression parameters were
estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method using STATA. The least-square
regression coe¢ cients can be found in Table 1. In the rst column we report the coe¢ cient
estimates associated with each variable and the standard errors are reported in the second
column. All the coe¢ cient estimates are signicantly di¤erent from zero, and the degree
of explanation of this model is quite signicant, as its adjusted R-Squared value is 0:99.
Figure 7 shows that the model ts well enough the sales of the rstgeneration.
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Table 1. Parameter estimates for rst generation. Dependent variable:
cumulative car sales 90-97
Variables Coe¢ cients Standard Error
p11 :0024427** :0005044
q11 :0096211** :0002366
11 :0000385** 3:23e  06
a  :2950706** :0107121
(*) signicant at the 10%, (**) 5% level
Figure 7. Firstgeneration, 1970-1996
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Then, using the estimates given in Table 1 and the average price of the last month prior
to introduction of Prever, we get the predicted sales of the rstgeneration cars after
1997. Substructing from the predicted sales the total actual sales of rstgeneration
cars after 1997, we get the number of secondgeneration cars that were bought monthly
by the potential customers of the rstgeneration (i.e. natural upgraders). Taking this
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number as a fraction over m1, we obtain f12. Substructing from the total number of sales
of the secondgeneration cars the number of upgraders and dividing this over market
potential m2, we get f22. Finally, we obtain monthly r12 as a fraction of cumulative
number of Prever program scrapped cars over cumulative number of rstgeneration
cars sales. As a result, the nal version of the compiled data set covers the time period of
January 1997 till June 2000 and contains all variables to estimate the system of non-linear
equations given in (3.5) using nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression analysis.
Then, we rst estimate

r12 (t) = ( +  r12 (t)) (1  r12 (t))
 
1 P11l=1 dlml (t) ;
where ml (t) are seasonal (or monthly) dummy variables which take the value of one in
a specic month and zero elsewhere. To avoid multicollinearity problems derived from
the fact that
P12
l=1ml (t) = 1, we have omitted one in the above specication. The
regression parameters were estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method using
STATA. Its least-square regression coe¢ cients can be found in Table 2. All the coe¢ cient
estimates are signicantly di¤erent from zero, and the degree of explanation of this model
is quite signicant, as its adjusted R-Squared value is 0:99. Figure 8 shows the original
time series against the forecasts of the fraction of individuals owning a product from the
rst generation who have upgraded it to a product of the secondgeneration. We
observe a good t of the model with an increasing trend and a seasonality pattern of
the rates, implying that Plan Prever generates incentives to upgrade the product to the
secondgeneration.
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Table 2. Parameter estimates for scraped cars. Dependent variable:
cumulative number of scrapped cars 97-00
Variables Coe¢ cients Standard Error
 :0009249** :000034
 :0095854** :0005886
(*) signicant at the 10%, (**) 5% level
Figure 8. Upgraders
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Assuming that the e¤ect of scraped cars and prices is the same in both generations
we have the following equations to estimate:

f 12 = (p12 + q1f12 + br12f12) (1  f11   f12)(1  2P2)
 
1 P11l=1 dlml

f 22 = (p22 + q2f12 + q2f22 + br12f22) (1  f22)(1  2P2)
 
1 P11l=1 dlml
Here we again include some additional dummy variables to model the monthly pattern
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of sales. We estimate these system of nonlinear equations using STATA. Its least-square
regression coe¢ cients can be found in Table 3. All the coe¢ cient estimates are signi-
cantly di¤erent from zero, and the degree of explanation of this model is quite signicant,
as its R-Squared value is 0:96.
Table 3. Parameter estimates for rstgeneration. Dependent variable:
cumulative car sales 90-97
Variables Coe¢ cients Standard Error
p12 :0094652** :00317
q1  1:143466* :65044
p22 :0257948** :0085261
q2 :3049893** :0848661
b :6355303* 0:378241
2 0:0000558** :00000
(*) signicant at the 10%, (**) 5% level
Figure 9 shows the original time series against the forecasts of the departing rate
from potential customers of the rstgeneration to purchase the secondgeneration.
Although this rate is more or less stable for the period of the study, the net penetration
of generation "two" shows an increasing trend and a seasonality pattern of the rates (see
Figure 10).
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Figure 9. Customers from market of 1 to buy the 2nd
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Figure 10. Net penetration of the 2nd
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In this context, the automobile industry faces an optimal decision problem similar
to the one described in Section 3.3.1, slightly modied to accommodate it to our data.
As the rebate amount is xed over time, we set 12D12 (t) = 4:8 (in thousands), and
assume that the decision maker maximizes its prots only by choosing the prices of the
rst and the second generations. To simplify the exposition, we set costs consid-
ering a 35% mark-up value for the rst generation and 40% for the second (i.e.
mark up = (price-cost)/price). Using the parameter estimates of the model obtained
above, we compute the optimal pricing decisions for both the rstand the second
generations. For the optimal decisions, we consider a non recession what if scenario
(i.e., we set the recession years dummies as zero). Figure 11 shows the optimal prices
for the "rst" and the "second" generations. Optimal price for the rst generation
increases slowly at rst when the "rst" generation models were just produced, before
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increasing sharply right after 1997 and then falling further. Interestingly, both optimal
prices for the rstand the "second" generations reach a peak almost at the same period
of time. This suggests that in the absence of competition and scale economies, variable
margins should increase over time.
Figure 11. Optimal prices
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Figure 12 shows the di¤usion of both product generations. The net di¤usion of
the rst generation goes up slowly, while the net di¤usion of the second increases
abruptly and then remains steady. The percentage of buyers of the rst generation
that upgraded to the second one, is signicantly higher that the percentage of potential
customers of the rstgeneration to purchase product of the second generation. This
suggests that the use of upgrade-rebate program has been an optimal strategy in this
context.
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Figure 12. Di¤usion of both generations
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From the analysis of the results, we can conclude that this approach is able to an-
alyze several generations, controlling with prices. We think that the industry might
have improved revenues optimizing the rebate amount (complementing the government
rebate), given the results of previous sections. Plan Prever expired in January 2008,
given the Spanish government budgetary cuts introduced with the economic crisis start-
ing the previous year. Interestingly, after the government withdrew the plan, some car
manufacturers have launched their own upgrade-rebate programs. For example, in 2011
Peugeot Spain launched its own rebate program, with a 2.600 euros on average by the
old car (that will be scrapped regardless of its value) for the last versions of the several
models (the rebate changes with the model). Renault also introduced a trade-in program
with 2500 euros rebate, and Citroën up to 300 Euros. In 2012, Nissan also launched
its ownrebate for some models, and Ford did the same with a rebate up to 5000 Euros.
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Clearly, the industry is intensively using this strategy to overcome the crisis downturn of
that period. These programs are industry driven, and performance data are not publicly
available.
We acknowledge that the presented application has some limitations. First, during
the considered period the industry did not control for an optimal rebate discount, but
simply accepted the government subsidy adapting their prices to this scenario which is
why in this section we simplify the model assuming that the producer only controls for the
prices. Second, before the Prever Plan, the Spanish government tested the e¤ectiveness
of similar car replacement promotions using temporary programs during the 1990s (Plan
Renove I lasted 6 months, and Plan Renove II lasted 9 months). We are overlooking
possible delayed e¤ects of older temporal programs, given that the aim of this section is
not a full analysis of this industry but to show the applicability of the model.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper studies how to use upgrade-rebate program as a strategic tool to manage
the di¤usion of successive product generations. Prior literature has considered upgrade-
rebate program as a means to disable second hand market of the products, to decrease
the regret of customers of buying the old generation product, to price discriminate the
customers. However, most of the previous models analyze the program in an essentially
static context. This paper takes a di¤erent approach to analyze the upgrade-rebate
program in a dynamic context, where it is used to control the whole di¤usion of the
successive generations.
We rst build a general di¤usion model for successive product generations, and demon-
strate conditions under which it is optimal to use upgrade-rebate programs. Our model
allows for leapfroggers, and can be easily adopted to analyze the upgraders through
the upgrade-rebate program. The model can be applied to study the di¤usion of non-
durables, as well as durable products.
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In order to analyze the e¤ect of upgrade-rebate strategy, we particularize the general
model for some concrete examples and numerically solve them for certain sets of parame-
ter values. For all the examples, we demonstrate that the trade-in program accelerates
the di¤usion of the later generations but has the reverse e¤ect for the di¤usion of the
old generation product. In order to quantify the e¤ect of the program, we compute the
optimal discounted prots under scenarios of implementing upgrade-rebate strategy or
not. We nd that the implementation of the upgrade-rebate strategy provides a 2  5%
increase in total discounted prots.
The size of the percentage gain in prots varies depending on several conditions. For
two generations, we demonstrate that when the rm takes the product prices as given,
the gain in prots is the highest, more than 5%. However, when the rm also controls
for prices, the increase in prots is less: 4:34%. We show that under trade-in strategy
the rm changes its pricing policy, charging lower levels of prices of the rst and higher
levels for the second generation products.
We also nd that for the rm it is optimal to provide the upgraders rebate amounts
even higher than the price of the new generation up to some time. Subsidizing adopters
and product giveaways have been studied previously in the context of one product gen-
eration (e.g. Kalish and Lilien 1983, Lehmann and Esteban-Bravo 2006). Kalish and
Lilien (1983) demonstrate that mostly optimal subsidies are likely to decline over time.
Lehmann and Esteban-Bravo (2006) examine when it is optimal to give away some prod-
ucts to innovators in a market consisting of two segments. In the context of two product
generations, we show that even if the rm provides the upgraders the new generation
products for free, it still faces more than a 3% increase in prots. We argue that this
gain in prots is not due to more adopters of the new generation product nor to the
change in pricing strategy of the rm, but merely to the di¤usion acceleration e¤ect of
the upgrade-rebate strategy.
Most managers favor faster waves of their product generations. We show that a
manager could create a tsunami through a trade-in strategy accelerating the di¤usion of
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later generations. Obviously, this strategy should be carried out in parallel with other
marketing mix decisions, such as pricing. A simpler implication is that a manager could
provide new generation products to the owners of the old generation, even for free, in
order to achieve rapid adoption of the new generation.
Our modeling framework has made a number of assumptions that can be relaxed to
have a better understanding of trade-in strategy in a dynamic context. For example,
we assumed that the proportion of customers who upgrade once never upgrade again in
the future, i.e. rebate-upgrades are not iterated. We can relax this assumption, albeit
increasing complexity. For instance, we can allow a maximum of J iterated rebate-
upgrades, then sales for all generations are given by the vector
S (t) =

f (t)0m+
JX
j=1
d
dt
n
r (t)j f (t)0m
o
;
d
dt
n
r (t)j f (t)0m
o
=

jf (s)

r (s)j 1 +

f (s) r (s)j
0
m
where d
dt
n
r (t)j f (t)0m
o
are sales associated to j   th iterated upgrade, and the last
equality is based on

f (t) r (t)j
0
m =
Z t
0

jf (s)

r (s)j 1 +

f (s) r (s)j
0
mds:
since j
R t
0

f (s)

r (s)j 1
0
mds =

f (t) r (t)j
0
m   R t
0
 
f (s) r (s)j
0
mds: But we have
not dealt with this case in the paper, i.e. we set J = 1.
Additional renement could be considering other marketing mix variables such as
advertising, and the timing decision of product generation launch and trade-in strategies.
Neither do we consider competition for the rm from the second-hand markets. We leave
these extensions for future research.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 A1: Two generations with exogenous prices
Let  = (1 (t) ; 2 (t) ; 3 (t)) be the multiplier vector associated with the state variables
f11, f12, f22, respectively, and  be the multiplier associated with r12. Also, let the
Hamiltonian function H of the optimal control be given by:
H =
8<: H1 if  1 < t <  2H2  2 < t <1
where
H1 (ft; rt; Dt; t; t) = e
 rt1 (t) + 1

f 11
and
H2 (ft; rt; Dt; t; t) = e
 rt2 (t) + 1

f 11 + 2

f 12 + 3

f 22 + 1

r12
where t and t be the multiplier matrixes associated with the state variables ft and rt,
respectively. The maximum principle conditions are
@Ht
@D12
= 0;
_t =  @Ht
@ft
;
_t =  
@Ht
@rt
together with initial conditions at introduction times, and transversality conditions
of t and t tending to zero (numerically we equalize them to zero for large t). Also, we
require the state variables and multipliers be continuous at  2.
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Maximum Principle conditions for  1 < t <  2
As the second generation is not introduced by time  2, there is no optimality condition
for the rebates. The multiplier is obtained from the following di¤erential equation:
_1 =  e rt (q11 (1  f11 (t))  p11   q11f11 (t)) (1  11P1 (t))
 
m1 (P1 (t)  c1 (t)) + 1ert

_2 = 0; _3 = 0; _1 = 0 (3.6)
Maximum Principle conditions  2 < t < T
The optimality conditions for rebate D12 yield:
0 = e rtf11m1 (12 + 12r12 (t)) (1  r12 (t))12

(P2 (t)  c2 (t))  2D12 (t) + 1e
rt
f11m1

 e rt (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) (1  11P1 (t))m1r12
D12 (t) =
1
2

(P2 (t)  c2 (t)) + 1e
rt
f11m1

 (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) (1  11P1 (t)) r12
2f11 (12 + 12r12 (t)) (1  r12 (t))12
The state variables and multipliers are obtained from the Boundary Value Problem,
consisted of the four di¤erential equations of the state variables and 4 di¤erential equa-
tions of multipliers given by:
_1 =  e rt (q11 (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t))  p11   q11f11 (t)) (1  11P1 (t)) (3.7) 
m1 (P1 (t)  c1 (t) + r12 (P2 (t)  c2 (t) D12 (t))) + 1ert
 
e rt
 
b112r12 (t) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) 
 
p12 + q
1
12f12 (t) + q
1
22f22 (t) + b
1
12r12 (t) f11 (t)

 (1  12P2 (t))
 
m1 (P2 (t)  c2 (t)) + 2ert
 
e rtb212r12 (t) (1  f22 (t)) (1  22P2 (t))
 
m2 (P2 (t)  c2 (t)) + 3ert
 
e rtm1 (12 + 12r12 (t)) (1  r12 (t))12D12 (t) (P2 (t)  c2 (t) D12 (t))
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_2 = e
 rt (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  11P1 (t)) (3.8) 
m1 (P1 (t)  c1 (t) + r12 (P2 (t)  c2 (t) D12 (t))) + 1ert
 
e rt
 
q112 (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) 
 
p12 + q
1
12f12 (t) + q
1
22f22 (t) + b
1
12r12 (t) f11 (t)

(1  12P2 (t))
 
m1 (P2 (t)  c2 (t)) + 2ert
 
e rtq212 (1  f22 (t)) (1  22P2 (t))
 
m2 (P2 (t)  c2 (t)) + 3ert

_3 = 0  (3.9)
e rtq122 (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) (1  12P2 (t))
 
m1 (P2 (t)  c2 (t)) + 2ert
 
e rt
 
q222 (1  f22 (t)) 
 
p22 + q
2
12f12 (t) + q
2
22f22 (t) + b
2
12r12 (t) f11 (t)

(1  22P2 (t))
 
m2 (P2 (t)  c2 (t)) + 3ert

_1 =  e rt (12 (1  r12 (t))  (12 + 12r12 (t)))12D12 (t) (3.10) 
f11m1 (P2 (t)  c2 (t) D12 (t)) + 1ert
 
e rt (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) (1  11P1 (t))m1 (P2   c2  D12 (t))
 e rtb112f11 (t) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) (1  12P2 (t))
 
m1 (P2 (t)  c2 (t)) + 2ert

 e rtb212f11 (t) (1  f22 (t)) (1  22P2 (t))
 
m2 (P2 (t)  c2 (t)) + 3ert

For the benchmark scenario when the upgrade-rebate program is not implemented,
the optimal control problem is a special case where
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D12 (t) = 0;

r12 = 0; _1 = 0
3.7.2 A.2. Two generations with endogenous prices
The optimal solution of this scenario is similar to that of the case when the rm takes
the prices as given. The maximum principle conditions are
@Ht
@D12
= 0;
@Ht
@P1
= 0;
@Ht
@P2
= 0;
_t =  @Ht
@ft
;
_t =  
@Ht
@rt
together with initial conditions at introduction times, and transversality conditions
t and t tending to zero.
Maximum Principle conditions  1 < t <  2
The optimality condition for price is:
0 =  e rt (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)) 11m1

P1 (t)  c1 (t)  (1  11P1 (t))
11
+
1
e rtm1

We rearrange the terms to get:
P1 (t) =
1
2

c1 (t) +
1
11
  1
e rtm1

As the second generation is not introduced before  2, there is no optimality condition
for rebate and price of the second generation. The multiplier is given from the di¤erential
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equation as in (6).
Maximum Principle conditions  2 < t < T
The optimality conditions for discount D12 yield:
0 = e rtf11m1 (12 + 12r12 (t)) (1  r12 (t))12

(P2 (t)  c2 (t))  2D12 (t) + 1e
rt
f11m1

 e rt (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) (1  11P1 (t))m1r12
The optimality conditions for prices are:
0 =  e rt (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) 11m1 
P1 (t)  c1 (t) + r12 (P2 (t)  c2 (t))  (1  11P1 (t))
11
  r12D12 (t) + 1
e rtm1

0 =  e rt  p12 + q112f12 (t) + q122f22 (t) + b112r12 (t) f11 (t) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) 12m1 
P2 (t)  c2 (t)  (1  12P2 (t))
12
+
2
e rtm1

 
 e rt  p22 + q212f12 (t) + q222f22 (t) + b212r12 (t) f11 (t) 22m2 
P2 (t)  c2 (t)  (1  22P2 (t))
22
+
3
e rtm2

e rtf11m1 (12 + 12r12 (t)) (1  r12 (t))12D12 (t)
e rt (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) (1  11P1 (t))m1r12:
We simplify the equations and represent the system as above, given three equations
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in matrix form as:  (P1 (t) ; P2 (t) ; D12 (t))0 = 	, where
 11 = (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) 11r12
 12 = f11 (12 + 12r12 (t)) (1  r12 (t))12
 13 =  2f11 (12 + 12r12 (t)) (1  r12 (t))12
	1 =  

f11 (12 + 12r12 (t)) (1  r12 (t))12

 c2 (t) + 1e
rt
f11m1

  (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) r12]
 21 = 2
 22 = r12
 23 =  r12
	2 =  

 c1 (t)  r12c2 (t)  1
11
+
1
e rtm1

 31 =   (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) 11m1r12
 32 =  2
 
p12 + q
1
12f12 (t) + q
1
22f22 (t) + b
1
12r12 (t) f11 (t)

(1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)) 12m1
 2  p22 + q212f12 (t) + q222f22 (t) + b212r12 (t) f11 (t) (1  f22 (t)) 22m2
 33 = f11m1 (12 + 12r12 (t)) (1  r12 (t))12
	3 =
 
p12 + q
1
12f12 (t) + q
1
22f22 (t) + b
1
12r12 (t) f11 (t)

(1  f11 (t)  f12 (t))
12m1

 c2 (t)  1
12
+
2
e rtm1

+ 
p22 + q
2
12f12 (t) + q
2
22f22 (t) + b
2
12r12 (t) f11 (t)

(1  f22 (t))
22m2

 c2 (t)  1
22
+
3
e rtm2

 
(p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t))m1r12]
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Using Cramers rule we express P1 (t) ; P2 (t) ; D12 (t) in terms of the state variables and
multipliers. Finally, the optimal state variables and multipliers are obtained solving the
Boundary Value Problem analogously to the model with exogenous prices.
For the benchmark scenario when the upgrade-rebate program is not implemented,
the optimal control problem is a special case where

r12 = 0; D12 = 0; _1 = 0
3.7.3 A.3. Three generations
We provide the solution for the case of 3 generations only for when the 3rd generation
is introduced (i.e. t >  3). The optimality conditions before the introduction of the 3rd
generation are similar to the case of two generations.
For the case of 3 generations, the half-vectorization of

f (t) and

r (t) matrices is the
following:
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:

f 11 = (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)  f13 (t)) (1  11P1 (t)),

f 12 = (p12 + q
1
12f12 (t) + q
1
22f22 (t) + b
1
12r12 (t) f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)  f13 (t))
(1  12P2 (t))

f 13 = (p13 + q
1
13f13 (t) + q
1
23f23 (t) + q
1
33f33 (t) + b
1
13r13 (t) f11 (t)+
b123r23 (t) (f12 (t) + f22 (t))) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)  f13 (t)) (1  13P3 (t))

f 22 = (p22 + q
2
12f12 (t) + q
2
22f22 (t) + b
2
12r12 (t) f11 (t)) (1  f22 (t)  f23 (t)) (1  22P2 (t))

f 23 = (p23 + q
2
13f13 (t) + q
2
23f23 (t) + q
2
33f33 (t) + b
2
13r13 (t) f11 (t)+
b23r23 (t) (f12 (t) + f22 (t))) (1  f22 (t)  f23 (t)) (1  23P3 (t))

f 33 = (p33 + q
3
13f13 (t) + q
3
23f23 (t) + q
3
33f33 (t) + b
3
13r13 (t) f11 (t)+
b323r23 (t) (f12 (t) + f22 (t))) (1  f33 (t)) (1  33P3 (t))
and
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8>>><>>>:

r12 =
 
12 + 
1
12r12 (t)

(1  r12 (t)  r13 (t))12D12 (t) ;

r13 =
 
13 + 
1
13r13 (t) + 
1
23r23 (t)

(1  r12 (t)  r13 (t))13D13 (t) ;

r23 =
 
23 + 
2
13r13 (t) + 
2
23r23 (t)

(1  r23 (t))23D23 (t)
The company prots are:
 =
Z 1
0
e rt(t) dt =
Z 1
0
e rt
 
f 11m1 (P1 (t)  c1 (t))
+
 
f 12m1 +

f 22m2 + f11m1

r12 +

f 11m1r12

(P2 (t)  c2 (t))
+
 
f 13m1 +

f 23m2 +

f 33m3 + f11m1

r13 +

f 11m1r13
+(f12m1 + f22m2)

r23 +
 
f 12m1 +

f 22m2

r23

(P3 (t)  c3 (t))
 

f11m1

r12 +

f 11m1r12

D12 (t) 

f11m1

r13 +

f 11m1r13

D13 (t)
 

(f12m1 + f22m2)

r23 +
 
f 12m1 +

f 22m2

r23

D23 (t)

dt
Let the Hamiltonian function H of the optimal control be given by:
Ht (ft; rt; Pt; Dt; t; t) = e
 rt(t) + 1

f 11 + 2

f 12 + 3

f 13 + 4

f 22 + 5

f 23 + 6

f 33
+1

r12 + 2

r13 + 3

r23
where t and t be the multiplier matrices associated with the state variables ft and rt,
respectively. The maximum principle conditions are
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@Ht
@D12
= 0;
@Ht
@D13
= 0;
@Ht
@D23
= 0
_t =  @Ht
@ft
;
_t =  
@Ht
@rt
The optimality conditions for discounts D12,D13,D23 yield, respectively:
e rtf11m1
 
12 + 
1
12r12 (t)

(1  r12 (t)  r13 (t))12

(P2 (t)  c2 (t))  2D12 (t) + 1e
rt
f11m1

 e rt (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)  f13 (t)) (1  11P1 (t))m1r12 = 0
D12 (t) =
1
2

(P2 (t)  c2 (t)) + 1e
rt
f11m1

 (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)  f13 (t)) (1  11P1 (t)) r12
2f11
 
12 + 
1
12r12 (t)

(1  r12 (t)  r13 (t))12
0 = e rtf11m1
 
13 + 
1
13r13 (t) + 
1
23r23 (t)

(1  r12 (t)  r13 (t))13 
(P3 (t)  c3 (t))  2D13 (t) + 2e
 rt
f11m1

 e rt (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)  f13 (t)) (1  11P1 (t))m1r13
D13 (t) =
1
2

(P3 (t)  c3 (t)) + 2e
rt
f11m1

 (p11 + q11f11 (t)) (1  f11 (t)  f12 (t)  f13 (t)) (1  11P1 (t)) r13
2f11
 
13 + 
1
13r13 (t) + 
1
23r23 (t)

(1  r12 (t)  r13 (t))13
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0 = e rt (f12m1 + f22m2)
 
23 + 
2
13r13 (t) + 
2
23r23 (t)

(1  r23 (t))23 
(P3 (t)  c3 (t))  2D23 (t) + 3e
rt
(f12m1 + f22m2)

 
e rt
 
p12 + q
1
12f12 (t) + q
1
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The state variables and multipliers are obtained from the following Boundary Value
Problem:
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For the scenario when the upgrade-rebate program is not implemented, the optimal
control problem is a special case of the previous example where

r12 = 0;

r13 = 0;

r23 = 0
D12 = 0; D13 = 0; D23 = 0
_1 = 0; _2 = 0; _3 = 0
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Chapter 4
Dynamic Crossed E¤ects between
A¢ liate Marketing, Direct Access
and Organic Search Tra¢ c, Sales
and Revenues
4.1 Introduction
Online promotion has been growing steadily during the past decade. Internet advertising
revenues in the USA alone more than doubled from $12 billion total in 2005 to $26
billion in 2010, reaching a 15% growth in the last year (Interactive Advertising Bureau,
2011). A¢ liate marketing, a powerful online advertising tool exploiting Word-of-Mouth
(WOM), has become an important source of customer acquisition for many online retailers
(Ho¤man and Novak, 2000; Libai et al., 2003). A¢ liate marketing programs consist of an
online retailer placing a link on a third party (i.e. a¢ liates) website. A network of a¢ liate
organizations can direct potential customers into a merchants web page receiving referral
fees in return. There are two types of pricing models. A commonly used mechanism is
called pay-per-lead, when the advertiser only pays for leads delivered that does not
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imply a purchase of the product the payment is done regardless whether the referrals are
converted into buyers or not. Another type of pricing strategy is when the advertiser pays
the a¢ liates a referral fee for every referral that has been converted into a buyer, and is
called pay-per-conversion. When a user clicks on the link on the a¢ liates website and
is directed to the advertisers web page, then the resulting purchase is attributed to the
a¢ liate company, who receives some commission. Only these direct visits that generated
revenues are attributed to a¢ liate marketing when evaluating a¢ liates e¤ectiveness.
Referral reward programs gain more and more importance as a means for customer
acquisition. From a historic perspective, a¢ liate marketing was pioneered by William
J. Tobin, the founder of PC Flowers & Gifts, in 1989. In 1994, CDnow launched its
BuyWeb program. Shortly after, in 1996, Amazon.com launched its Associates program.
Nowadays, many websites draw prots from a¢ liate programs. In fact, Forrester Research
estimates that a¢ liate marketing spending in the United States will reach $4 billion by
2014, with annual growth rate of 16%.
Online retailers often wonder if referrals from a¢ liate marketing cannibalize sales
from di¤erent online tra¢ c sources, such as direct sales and converted organic search.
Reciprocally, do direct and organic online clicks and sales a¤ect the performance of af-
liate marketing webs? The WOM spread by referral sites may strengthen consumers
awareness, stimulating direct access and organic searches. Quantifying these e¤ects is
crucial: if a¢ liate marketing falls, which is the impact on direct and organic-search
sales? And reciprocally, do a¢ liate websites draw clicks/sales from non-converted previ-
ous organic searches? These relationships must be studied from a dynamic perspective,
as consumers can access through any of these alternative online sources, decide to post-
pone their purchases, and return later for subsequent purchases through other web tra¢ c
sources. Besides, the indirect e¤ects between clicks, sales and revenues coming from each
source can be di¤erent, implying that we must study all of these variables to have the
full picture.
The study of these dynamic relationships must include all the a¢ liate sources. Af-
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liate companies vary in the volume of their operations, contribution to the advertisers
online sales (Ray, 2001), the degree of commonality of own and advertisers products
(Papatala and Bhatnagar, 2002). Because a¢ liate webs are so heterogenous, the e¤ect
on advertisers sales and revenues is likely to be quite heterogeneous across a¢ liates.
This requires to estimate a disaggregated large dimensional vector time series model.
Given the large number of a¢ liates, the estimation a standard vector time series model,
such as Vector AutoRegression (VAR) or a Vector Error Correction (VEC) models, is
challenging. Instead, we employ a dynamic factor model suitable for large dimensions.
In particular we follow the Global Vector AutoRegressive (GVAR) analysis considered
by Pesaran et al. (2004). While common factors provide guidance on overall trends,
results for individual a¢ liates may vary. Based on the dynamic factor model, we build
a global VAR model for a better understanding of the crossed dynamic e¤ects between
each variable, computing the impulse response functions (IRFs) from this model.
We present an empirical application, based on data from an online retailer of jewelry.
Jewelry is durable product, and our analysis focuses on long run e¤ects. We therefore
model cumulative sales, clicks and revenues. Our ndings reect in detail the dynamic
forces shaping the a¢ liate marketing industry. The results of Impulse Response Func-
tion analysis show signicant long term e¤ect of a¢ liate marketing that clearly di¤ers
across a¢ liates. It is also important to note that the e¤ects may be di¤erent for clicks,
conversions, and revenues.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we provide a brief literature
review. The third section describes the research framework and modeling approach. We
then present our data set and empirical ndings, and discuss the implications of our
results for a¢ liate marketing. We nish with conclusion, limitations and future research
steps.
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4.2 Literature review
The marketing literature has studied how the consumer response to advertising can be
magnied through WOM (Arndt, 1967; Hogan, Lemon and Libai, 2004). In the context
of customer referrals, the existing literature also provides guidance to when customer
referrals should be used (e.g. Biyalogorsky et al, 2001), analyzing the monetary value
of a referral (Kumar, Petersen, and Leone, 2010) and the di¤erential value between
referred and non-referred customers (Schmitt et al., 2011). Marketing researchers have
also started to study online business-to-business referrals. Libai et al. (2003) analyze why
there exist both payment methods (pay-per-conversion and pay-per-lead) in a¢ liation
marketing. Cai and Chen (2011) identify at least two forms of in-store referrals: a retailer
may display the links to the competing retailers directly (direct referral), or display the
referral link provided by a third-party advertising agency (third-party referral), both of
which can be either one-way or two-way. Cai and Chen (2011) analytically study when the
retailer should adopt referrals and compare the di¤erent forms of in-store referrals. Using
survey data, Papatala and Bhatnagar (2002) study the choice of the right mix of a¢ liate
companies. They nd that the decision is going to depend on the relationship of the
products that o¤er the a¢ liates and the advertiser: strict substitutes, strict complements,
episodic substitutes, and episodic complements. Taking the a¢ liates perspective, Akcura
(2010) studies analytically the incentives of rms to join an a¢ liate marketing program
diverting their customers to other websites. Still more research is needed to understand
the performance of this type of programs.
Given the dynamic nature of WOM, the study of dynamic and long-term e¤ects of
a¢ liate marketing on performance of the e¤ectiveness advertising rests on as a fundamen-
tal understanding of the question. First, the customers acquired by a¢ liates may later
return to the online retailers website through other channels of tra¢ c for a subsequent
purchase. Second, these customers might refer other potential buyers to the website
through WOM. A¢ liate networks might also improve the rankings of advertisers web
page in search engine results (Janssen and van Heck, 2007). Thus, some a¢ liates not only
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refer visitors and buyers to the retailers website, but might also have long-term e¤ects
on the retailers tra¢ c, sales and revenues. On the other hand, however, a¢ liates may
cannibalize the merchants other marketing e¤ort (i.e. they refer those customers who
would visit the retailers website in any case). Indirect e¤ect have been found relevant in
other contexts, such as paid search advertising. Using aggregate data of an e-commerce
automotive company, Rutz et al. (2011) show that neglecting indirect e¤ects of prior
visits based on keyword searches can negatively bias paid search advertising conversion
rates and upwardly bias sales revenues attributed to other tra¢ c sources such as direct
type-in and bookmark visitors.
This paper considers the dynamic e¤ect of a¢ liate marketing on the advertisers
tra¢ c, sales and revenues. We restrict our study to pay-per-conversionpricing strategy,
although the analysis is valid under both payment arrangements. We investigate the e¤ect
of prior visits attributed to each a¢ liate company on the number of visits from direct
access and bookmark, organic search, and other sources of tra¢ c. In contrast to Rutz et
al. (2011), we analyze the dynamic e¤ect of a¢ liate marketing on not only the number
of visits, but also on associated sales quantities and revenues to each channel.
4.3 Empirical Setting and Preliminary Analysis
Our empirical application is based on a weekly data set from an online retailer of jewelry.
The data span 93 weeks, from January 2010 to October 2011. For this period of time
we track the number of visits (clicks) to the retailers website, the number of quantity
purchased of the retailers products and the associated revenues from each a¢ liate. We
also observe the number of visits, purchased quantity and revenues disaggregated by the
retailers tra¢ c sources: organic search, direct access and bookmark, and other.
In our sample period there are almost 800 a¢ liate companies associated through
a large online advertising company, which have positive click-throughs or impressions,
however only 181 of them bring at least one nal buyer. We note that in our dataset a
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large part of revenues is generated by small group of a¢ liates, which is a common pattern
in a¢ liate marketing (see, e.g., Ray, 2001). We let A¢ liateA denote the aggregation of
all small a¢ liates that individually bring less than 0:5% of purchased quantity during the
sample period together accounting for more than 10% share of a¢ liate sales. Then, the
remaining thirteen companies (denoted by A¢ liateB,...,A¢ liateN ) provide nearly 90%
of a¢ liate sales. Table 1 reports the total number of clicks, sales quantity and revenues
coming from each a¢ liate during the sample period, with their corresponding shares.
Table 1. A¢ liatesclicks, sales, revenues and their shares for the sample period
Clicks Sales Revenues(thousand$)
Variable Total Share Total Share Total Share
A¢ liateA 188364 36:395 1359 10:56 211586:5 25:22
A¢ liateB 22024 4:255 837 6:504 25102:1 2:99
A¢ liateC 952 0:184 213 1:655 17513:5 2:09
A¢ liateD 54939 10:615 1373 10:669 79134:7 9:43
A¢ liateE 186240 35:984 7075 54:977 265749:2 31:68
A¢ liateF 4068 0:786 126 0:979 13572:1 1:62
A­ iateG 29937 5:784 445 3:457 50863:1 6:06
A¢ liateH 6824 1:318 188 1:461 21937:5 2:61
A¢ liateI 1486 0:287 203 1:577 33777:2 4:03
A¢ liateJ 9603 1:855 129 1:002 15712:6 1:87
A¢ liateK 8993 1:737 412 3:201 27092:9 3:23
A¢ liateL 1406 0:271 237 1:842 26009:4 3:10
A¢ liateM 1371 0:265 188 1:461 36898:0 4:39
A¢ liateN 1347 0:260 84 0:652 13798:7 1:65
Total 517554 100 12869 100 838747:4 100
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The weekly mean of the revenues brought up by each a¢ liate is higher than $140. For
the whole period, A¢ liateA, which is aggregation of several small a¢ liates, has a high
share of clicks but a low sales conversion rate. A¢ liateE is the most protable a¢ liate
among all, accounting for $21000 revenue for at least one week during the observation
period. A¢ liateM has a small clicks share of 0; 26%, the conversion rate is so good that
renders 1:46% of sales, and drives a 4; 39% of a¢ liates-driven revenues.
We also considered alternative tra¢ c to the retailers site: (1) Organic, coming from
search engines (including Google, Yahoo, Bing, Nextag, Ask Jeeves, Aol search, msn
search, and several other minor search engines), (2) direct type-in and bookmarked ac-
cess, and (3) other sources (including tra¢ c from special webpages such as happy-
annyversary.com, dealnews.com, social networks such as facebook.com, etc.). Regarding
the data for each tra¢ c source, the number of site visits by tra¢ c sources is fairly equal
for the sample period with direct type-in visits accounting for slightly less portion (31%)
in the total number of visits. However, the pattern is di¤erent for sales quantity and rev-
enues, othersource accounting for the larger portion of sales and associated revenues
than organictra¢ c from search engines (see Table 2).
Table 2. Tra¢ c source clicks, sales, revenues and their shares for the sample period
Clicks Sales Revenues (thousand $)
Total Share Total Share Total Share
Organic 395190 33:65 5196 11 924021 20
Direct 372886 31:75 14716 31 1617468 33
Other 406319 34:59 27515 58 2255320 47
Total 1174395 100 47427 100 4796809 100
As exogenous global variables for all the tra¢ c sources we consider three variables:
weekly average prices of gold and silver per troy ounce in US dollars, and a weekly measure
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of jewelry search intensity in Google. The latter measure shows how many searches have
been done in Google where the term "jewelry" is present. This variable shows how many
searches have been done for a period of time relative to total number of Google searches.
These data are scaled to 0 100 basis, i.e. the number of searches for each week is divided
on the biggest number of searches during the year and is multiplied by 100. In fact, the
search intensity variable achieves its the maximum value of 100 during Christmas 2010.
The overall numbers of visits (clicks) to the retailers site coming from organic search,
direct access or bookmark, and other sources show a seasonal increment starting two
weeks prior to Christmas 2010 and a reduction of activity during February. A similar
pattern is present also for the sales quantity and revenues from the retailers each tra¢ c
source, as well as for the a¢ liate data series. Instead of applying intervention analysis in
the time series model (with deterministic dummies associated to special weeks), we use
a more related exogenous series. In particular we use a standardized variable of weekly
search activities of term jewelry from Google Insights. This series is associated with
the seasonal peaks, and therefore provides a good basis to forecast any sudden increment
or drop due to calendar e¤ects.
Let us stack all the considered endogenous variables in a time series vector fXtg.
Before considering a multivariate time series model, we examine the stationarity of the
weekly series. Then, we say that a time series fXtg is integrated of order d 2 f0; 1; 2; ::g,
also denoted as I (d) ; if each coordinate in dXt follows an invertible stationary linear
model, where d = (1  L)d and L is the lag operator (LjXt = Xt j). Integrated series
are said to have unit roots. In line with Deese et al. (2007), we perform Augmented
Dickey-Fuller unit root test and weighted symmetric (WS) estimation of ADF type re-
gressions proposed by Park and Fuller (1995). We use Schwartz Bayesian criterion (SBC)
to select the lag length employed in unit root test. For each variable, we perform two
unit root test regression: one including an intercept and a trend, and another includ-
ing an intercept only. We also looked at the graphs and the autocorrelation functions.
The results suggest that these series are stationary, particularly after removing the sea-
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sonal e¤ects. However, the price of gold and silver are found to be I(1), meanwhile the
standardized search intensity variable is stationary (see Table 3). Notice that I(0) and
I(1) series cannot be related by a stable lter. Furthermore, the fact that the series are
stationary, makes impossible to nd permanent e¤ects between these variables.
Table 3. Unit root test for common observed variables
with trend no trend
Variables ADF WS ADF WS Conclusion
Price of Gold  3:34565  3:11713  0:53958  0:36206 I(1)
Price of Silver  2:52258  2:40395  1:18929  1:18215 I(1)
Search Intensity  3:99446  4:18537  3:84999  4:01034 I(0)
Critical value  3:45  3:24  2:89  2:55
Given the fact that jewelry is a durable product and our interest to explore persis-
tent indirect e¤ects, we have decided to model cumulative clicks, sales and revenues for
a¢ liates and for the tra¢ c sources, keeping the original gold and silver prices which are
I(1) in levels. All the variables are now I(1). Given a vector fXtg of k time series, all of
them I (1) ; we say that the series are cointegrated if there are r  k linear combinations
dened by the kr matrix  such that 0Xt is jointly I (0) : Cointegrated series are typi-
cally modeled using error correction models, whereas non cointegrated series are modeled
using a VAR for fXtg. In the next section we build a factor model where the unob-
served factors are allowed to be cointegrated. If there is cointegration, the specication
process will lead us to a vector error correction model. If there is no cointegration, the
specication process will direct us to stationary VAR model between the di¤erentiated
variables.
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4.4 The Model
Our model will deal with N tra¢ c sources. In particular we consider N = 17 given by the
number of a¢ liates (in our case 14, after aggregating the small ones in A¢ liateA), plus
three additional key sources (organic search engines tra¢ c, direct access and bookmark,
and other sources). For each source i = 1; :::; N; at time t the retailer observes the
cumulative number of clicks over time, the cumulative number of quantity purchased
by customers attracted by each source and the associated cumulative revenues, which
we stack in vector Xit. We denote by dt the vector of observed global factors (in our
case, price for gold, price of silver, and jewelrysearches on internet). Notice that all
these variables are I (1). To overcome the dimensionality problem, we specify a dynamic
factor model. In particular we build a GVAR model (Pesaran et al. 2004, Dees et al.
2007). Denote the unobserved factor by ft; the model consider that for i = 1; 2; : : : ; N
and t = 1; 2; : : : ; T it is satised that:
Xit = i0 + i1t+  if ft +  id dt + it; (4.1)
where ( if ; id) is the matrix of factor loadings, and it are tra¢ c source specic ran-
dom shocks. The intercept and trend coe¢ cients i0; i1 are associated to deterministic
patterns. The model accommodates unit roots and cointegration relationships in Xit
allowing the unobserved and observed global factors ht = (f 0t ; d
0
t)
0 to be I (1) and to be
cointegrated, considering two independent process:
ht =
1X
l=0
l t l =  (L) t;
it =
1X
l=0
	il t l = 	i (L) it;
where  (L) ; 	i (L) are invertible polynomials in the lag operator L with absolutely sum-
mable coe¢ cients, t  IID (0; I) and it  IID (0; Ii) : Then V ar [it] =
P1
l=0	il	
0
il is
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bounded. To estimate this model, each tra¢ c source is decoupled from the rest of the
online sales sources. To that end we consider
i (L) = (1  L) 	i (L) 1 ;
which can be approximated by a nite polynomial as the coe¢ cients of 	i (L)
 1 tend to
zero at an exponential rate. In practice we consider pi lags (in our data, the empirical
analysis suggests p1 = 1 for all tra¢ c sources). Then we can rewrite the model as
i (L) (Xit   i0   i1t   if ft    id dt) = it: (4.2)
where dt is weakly exogenous. This model can be estimated independently for each tra¢ c
source, computing a weighted average Xt =
PN
j=1wjXjt; where wj  0 add up to one,
which is a process satisfying
Xt = 

0 + 

1t+  

f ft +  

d dt + 

t ;
where the parameters are weighted means of the original ones. Next, we introduce
some limit regularity on the tra¢ c sources. We assume that as N grows the parameter
means are stable, and for moderate N do not depend on i. Under regularity conditions
t = 

t   t 1 =
PN
j=1wj	j (L) jt tends to zero fast in mean square sense when
N ! 1 suggesting that t approximates a time invariant random variable : The
procedure also allows a specic means for each tra¢ c source, considering weights fwijgNj=1
and setting wii = 0 for a nite N . Using this idea and the assumption that  if has full
rank, the unobserved factor
ft !
 
 0f  

f
 1
 f (X

t   0   1t   d dt   )
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in a mean squared sense, and substituting these approximations in the model we obtain
i (L)

Xit   ei0   i1t  e id dt   e if Xit = uit: (4.3)
Without loss of generality, we can modify the lags in the observed exogenous factors dt.
4.4.1 Cointegration analysis per tra¢ c source
In the model we allow for cointegration in the original I (1) series. Substituting i (L) =
(1  L)	i (L) 1 in (4.3), and expanding the matrix lag polynomial 	i (L) in a Taylor
expansion around L = 1; we obtain

Xit   ei0   i1t  e id dt   e if Xit = (1  L) 1	i (L)uit
= (1  L) 1

	i (1) 	1)i (L) (1  L)

uit;
where the roots of
	1)i (L) are outside the unit circle, and the term (1  L) 1	i (1)uit
represents an stochastic trend. Cointegration between these series means that
0

Xit   ei0   i1t  e id dt   e if Xit is I (0) for a matrix  with full rank, which
happens if and only if the matrix 	1)i (1) satisfy 
0	1)i (1) = 0: The linear combination
must be interpreted as long-run equilibrium relationships between the original I (1) series
removed from the weakly exogenous and deterministic components. The rank of 	1)i (1)
determines the number of cointegration relationships in .
Similar arguments can be used to derive the vector error correction representation.
Since i (L)	i (L) = (1  L) I; then i (1)	1)i (1) = 0 implying that the rows of i (1)
belong to the linear space dened by 0	1)i (1) = 0 and we can express i (1) = i
0
i:
Taking a rst order Taylor expansion of i (L), and also adding and substracting i (1)L
we obtain that
i (L) = i (1) + 
1)
i (L) (1  L) =

i
0
iL+

i
0
i + 
1)
i (L)

(1  L)

:
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Substituting this expression in (4.3), renders the Grangers vector error correction repre-
sentation.
We conduct the empirical analysis making use of the Matlab GVAR Toolbox 1.1.
(Smith and Galesi, 2011). We rst conduct a cointegration analysis to identify whether
a long-run equilibrium exists among the series (i.e. the series are cointegrated). We
rst select the order of individual tra¢ c source VARX models, using Schwartz-Bayesian
information criterion. Afterwards we compute maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics,
used to determine the cointegration space for individual models. This analysis suggests
to use VECX(1; 1) estimation with r = 1 (one cointegration relationship) for each indi-
vidual model. The individual models are estimated following Johansens method. The
main assumption for estimating the individual tra¢ c source models is that Xit is weakly
exogenous with respect to the long run parameters of the conditional VEC model (for
details see Smith and Galesi, 2011, pp. 92).
Before conducting the dynamic analysis, we further diagnose the main assumptions
which underlie our GVAR modeling approach. We rst test weak exogeneity of Xit with
respect to long run parameters of VECX estimation. For all the individual models, the
weak exogeneity assumption was only rejected for 7 out of 102 tests at the 5% signicance
level. Further, we check the descriptive statistics and Jarque-Bera normality test for the
residuals obtained from VECX estimation. We also inspect the serial correlation of
VECX residuals based on Lagrange Multiplier serial correlation test with F statistics.
We observe that we fail to reject VECX residual serial correlation only for 7 cases out of
54 tests.
4.4.2 Global VAR Model
Dynamic models with unobserved factors are powerful tools for the analysis of dynamic
relationships between a large number of variables. The dynamic factor model provides
guidance on overall underlying trends, but given the heterogeneity of online tra¢ c drawn
from di¤erent sources it is convenient to build a global VAR model for an interpretation
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of co-movements between the di¤erent series. In particular, the estimated parameters of
dynamic factor model can be used to build a global VAR model to compute the impulse
response functions showing crossed dynamic e¤ects between the considered variables.
We stack all these variables in a column vector Xt = (X 01t; :::; X
0
Nt)
0 : This is a large
dimensional vector of I (1) variables. Noticing that the weighted average can be expressed
as Xit = WiXt; then all of the individual tra¢ c source equations can be grouped to build
a global structural VAR model,
G (L)Xt = 't + ut;
where 't is a column vector which stacks the deterministic trend and the observable
exogenous factors. This model is identied, since the weights Wi are known and the
individual submodels are indentied. In particular for p = 1 we obtain a GVAR(1)
model G0Xt = 't +G1Xt 1 + ut. Premultiplying both sides of the equation by G
 1
0 and
changing the notation, we obtain the GVAR(1) in the reduced form
Xt = G
 1
0 ('t +G1Xt 1 + ut) = t + F1Xt 1 + t: (4.4)
The latter can be udated recursively starting from an initial value X0; and used for
impulse response and forecasting analysis, which we perform in the following section.
4.5 Main results
In this section we discuss the short and long term e¤ects that we have found after
estimating the model. First we estimate the parameters for each submodel, which are
signicant and we perform diagnosis tests over the main exogeneity and lags specication
assumptions. Then the tra¢ c source submodels are integrated in a global VAR. We do
not include the estimators, given the large dimension of this table, and the discussion
will focus on the interpretation of direct and indirect e¤ects.
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4.5.1 Contemporaneous e¤ects
We rst study the contemporaneous e¤ects across the variables. Consider the model
Xt = t+F1Xt 1+t: Note that the elements of the matrix V ar (t) = G
 1
0 V ar (ut)G
0 1
0
contain the contemporary e¤ects across the variables in the global model. This matrix
contains contemporary e¤ects of cumulative clicks, sales and revenues both within each
tra¢ c source and across one tra¢ c source of the other. By contemporary e¤ects we mean
association of responses in several variables within the same week.
We observe that all the elements of the matrix V ar (t) are positive. Notice that pre
and postmultiplying V ar (t) by the inverse of the diagonal matrix Diag
np
V ar (it)
o
containing the standard deviations of the elements in t we obtain the correlation matrix.
The o¤-diagonal elements of the matrix show the correlation between the elements of the
vector t. Thus, the positive sign and size of the correlations suggest direct relationships
among cumulative clicks, sales, and revenues across all the the tra¢ c sources of the
online retailer. In particular, in Table 4 we report the contemporary e¤ects (correlations)
between cumulative clicks, sales, and revenues from direct access and organic search with
the variables from A¢ liateE and A¢ liateJ. We note that the positive contemporaneous
cross relationships could be due to positive higher awareness of the retailers website and
positive contemporaneous WOM spread by the buyers.
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Table 4. Contemporaneous cross e¤ects
A¢ liateE A¢ liateJ
Clicks Sales Revenues Clicks Sales Revenues
Direct Access
Clicks 0:58 0:31 0:64 0:56 0:56 0:54
Sales 0:61 0:32 0:67 0:55 0:56 0:57
Revenues 0:57 0:28 0:63 0:52 0:55 0:56
Organic Search
Clicks 0:45 0:22 0:49 0:51 0:50 0:47
Sales 0:51 0:27 0:63 0:52 0:51 0:51
Revenues 0:40 0:24 0:57 0:57 0:47 0:50
4.5.2 Dynamic e¤ects
We then turn to study the dynamic relationships between cumulative clicks, sales, and
revenues from the online retailers di¤erent sources of tra¢ c using (4.4). We rst note
that from the coe¢ cient matrix in the GVAR(1)
Xt = t + F1Xt 1 + t: (4.5)
one can get direct e¤ects of cumulative clicks, sales, and revenues at (t  1) on the same
variables at time t within and across each tra¢ c source. The direct e¤ects of di¤erent
a¢ liate companies are heterogenous. However, the impact of an increment in any of these
variables is transmitted indirectly to Xt+1; Xt+2; ::: In order to obtain a more complete
understanding we need to study the indirect e¤ects provided by the impulse response
functions.
In order to present the dynamic relationships between the series, we conduct im-
pulse response analysis. Note that the model (4.5) can be normalized premultiplying
by V ar (t)
1=2 to obtain orthogonal IRFs (as it is sometimes done in applied macro-
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economics), or one can compute the classical IRFs without any normalization (it is the
standard procedure in the time series literature) which has a more direct interpreta-
tion. In this paper we follow the second option, extracting the IRFs from the global
VAR autoregressive polynomial F (L) = (I   F1L) : Notice that the inverse of F (L) is
not convergent, as we have common stochastic trends, but we can apply cumulatively
F (L) 1 to error impulse shocks, and show how the e¤ects are transmitted. In particular
for a VAR(1) the impulse responses after l lags are given by the elements of the power
matrixes of (F1)
l. Note that some e¤ects will disappear, but others will be persistent or
even grow in time (as Xt are I (1) variables) so that the cumulative e¤ect of an impulse
diverges for these variables.
We mostly focus on the dynamic e¤ects on cumulative revenues. We rst investigate
the implications of a shock in cumulative clicks from a¢ liates on future cumulative clicks,
cumulative sales quantity and cumulative revenues drawn from organic search source and
direct type-in and bookmarked visits. We also examine the reverse e¤ect, i.e. the impact
of a past shock to cumulative clicks from organic search and direct access on cumulative
clicks, cumulative sales quantity and cumulative revenues drawn from a¢ liates. Because
of space limitations we do not report IRFs related to all of the a¢ liates. As an example,
we focus on the dynamic relationship of tra¢ c sources such as organic search and direct
access with A¢ liateE and A¢ liateJ. As can be observed from Table 1, A¢ liateE is the
one providing a larger portion of a¢ liate clicks, rendering a large proportion of sales and
revenues, but the conversion rate is not particularly good. On the other hand, A¢ liateJ
brought relatively few nal buyers during the sample period. Figures 1 and 2 show the
IRF plots for A¢ liateE and A¢ liateJ, respectively.
We observe that the impact of clicks from A¢ liateE on clicks, sales and driven by
organic search and direct access is negative, although the e¤ects decay over time (Figure
1, a). The clear implication is that A¢ liateE refers customers who would most likely
visit the online retailer through organic search or direct type-in and bookmark access
channels. However, the signs of the reverse e¤ect are not always the same. In particular,
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the e¤ect of clicks from organic search on clicks, sales and revenues from A¢ liateE is
negative, whereas in the case of direct type-in access is positive suggesting that some users
of A¢ liateE postpone their purchases typing in directly lager, and/or communicate the
address through WOM (Figure 1, b).
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Figure 1. Dynamic relationship between A¢ liateE and organic and direct access sources
(a) Response to clicks from A¢ liateE
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(b) Response of clicks, sales and revenues of A¢ liateE
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Turning to the dynamic relationship between A¢ liateJ and the tra¢ c sources of
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interest, we observe di¤erent patterns than in the case of A¢ liateE. Specically, the
impact of clicks from A¢ liateJ on clicks, sales and revenues from organic search and
direct type-in access is only negative for an initial one-two weeks growing to positive in
the long-run. Nevertheless, we note that this e¤ect becomes positive earlier for the case
of organic search channel than for direct type-in and bookmark access (Figure 2. a). In
contrast with case of A¢ liateE, the impact of clicks from organic search on clicks, sales
and revenues of A¢ liateJ is positive and growing over time. The impact of clicks from
direct type-in access on the variables related to A¢ liateJ is also positive, but decaying
over time.
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Figure 2. Dynamic relationship between A¢ liateJ and organic and direct access sources
(a) Response to clicks from A¢ liateJ
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(b) Response of clicks, sales and revenues of A¢ liateJ
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Comparing Figures 1 and 2, we observe that the dynamic cross-relationships between
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clicks, sales and revenues between the di¤erent tra¢ c sources can be very di¤erent.
Studying the crossed long term e¤ect of a past shock on clicks from each a¢ liate on
the revenues from organic search and direct type-in access, we nd that for 7 out of
14 a¢ liates the e¤ect is negative and for the other 7 it is positive. Examining these
relationships across all the a¢ liates, the general pattern found is that those clicks from
a¢ liates which are more e¤ective to conversion of clicks to sales and revenues have positive
long term impact on sales and revenues from organic search and direct type-in channels.
We have examined the e¤ect of past shocks on cumulative clicks from each a¢ liate on
the revenues rendered by the same a¢ liate (own e¤ects). Interestingly, for some a¢ liates
the own e¤ects are positive and for the others are negative. Overall, we observe four types
of dynamic e¤ects of clicks on revenues according to the own and cross e¤ect between
the di¤erent tra¢ c sources: (i) negative-positive, if for an a¢ liate the long term e¤ect
of a shocks in the cumulative clicks on own-tra¢ c cumulative revenues is negative, but
positive on revenues from direct and organic search access, then the potential customers
referred from this a¢ liate delay the decision returning later to the retailer either directly
or through an online search engine, and/or referring to other potential buyers the webpage
of the retailer (and not the a¢ liate); (2) positive-positive, positive-negative, in case
both the cross and own long term e¤ect on revenues are positive, we may consider that the
visitors from the a¢ liate do not only refer to the other buyers the website of the online
retailer, but also the website of the a¢ liate balancing the positive e¤ect across these
tra¢ c sources; (3) positive-negative, when but the own e¤ect on revenues is positive
but the cross e¤ect is negative, we postulate that the customers loyalty falls in the context
of the a¢ liate, who in the future may refer the customer to other manufacturers in the
future; and (4) negative-negative, in case both cross and own e¤ects are negative, we
postulate that this could be due to negative WOM spread by the visitors attracted by
the a¢ liate, indicating that the a¢ liate perhaps transmitted too high expectations or
a biased image. Sometimes the initial response falls in one of these types, but then it
changes after a short period (as we observe in Figure 2.a).
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Why are these long term e¤ects di¤erent across a¢ liates? One of the reasons could lie
in the relationship between the products o¤ered by the a¢ liates and the online retailer,
brought up by Papatala and Bhatnagar (2002). Another reason could be the promotional
tools employed by the a¢ liates. For instance, we nd that A¢ liateM has the highest
long term impact on the sales and revenues from organic search and direct type-in access.
From Table 3 it can be observed that A¢ liateM is also the most e¤ective a¢ liate in term
sales and revenue conversion, with on average each seventh click being converters to a
nal purchase. We further verify with the managers of the online retailer that this a¢ liate
is using search engine marketing as a main online marketing tool. Other reasons could
be a¢ liate specic characteristics such as website design and structure, the number and
heterogeneity of advertisers served by each a¢ liate, etc.
Unfortunately, there is not much research done towards explaining the reasons of dif-
ferent long terms e¤ects among a¢ liates. Nevertheless, our ndings reveal that a¢ liates
are di¤erent not only in their conversion rates, but also in cross and own long term e¤ects
on other channels of tra¢ c being negative for some cases. We suggest that the manager
of the online retailer should be cautious especially of those a¢ liates who exhibit negative
own and cross long term e¤ects on revenues. The manager of the online retailer should
carefully weight the positive contemporaneous benets against the long term negative
e¤ects. Some a¢ liates can be prioritized or given specic incentives to generate tra¢ c,
or withdrawn from the portfolio depending on the long run revenues response.
4.5.3 Forecasting Analysis
We use the GVAR model solution for forecasting purposes. For an illustration, we plot
forecasted number of cumulative clicks, cumulative sales quantity and revenues for dura-
tion of 40 weeks period from A¢ liateE, direct type-in and organic search access.
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Figure 3. Forecasted cumulative clicks, sales and revenues (in thousands)
0 20 40
150
200
250
300
Weeks
Clicks from AffiliateE
0 20 40
7
8
9
10
11
Weeks
Sales from AffiliateE
0 20 40
250
300
350
400
Weeks
Revenues from Affi l iateE
0 20 40
350
400
450
500
550
Weeks
Clicks from Direct Access
0 20 40
14
16
18
20
22
Weeks
Sales from Direct Access
0 20 40
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
Weeks
Revenues from Direct Access
0 20 40
300
400
500
600
Weeks
Clicks from Organic Search
0 20 40
5
6
7
8
Weeks
Sales from Organic Search
0 20 40
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
Weeks
Revenues from Organic Search
It can be observed, that within the forecast period the cumulative number of clicks
from A¢ liateE increased by nearly 49%, cumulative sales quantity by 50%, meanwhile
sales revenues by 43%. On the other hand, the cumulative number of clicks, sales, and
revenues increased by around 39%, 36%, and 34%, respectively, both for organic search
and direct type-in access. Similarly, the manager of the retailer could use the GVAR
solution for forecasting cumulative clicks, sales and revenues from the other tra¢ c sources.
The forecast analysis could be employed by the manager of the online retailer for
several managerial insights about its a¢ liate marketing. It can be used for comparison
of a¢ liate trends with each other. Forecast analysis can be also used to study the
composition of total number of clicks, sales quantity and revenues from di¤erent tra¢ c
sources, as well as the forecasted contribution of each a¢ liate to the general clicks, sales
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quantity and corresponding revenues.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper we attempted to look beyond the immediate e¤ect of a¢ liates and examined
a¢ liate marketing from dynamic point of view. The value of the visitors and nal buyers
attracted by the a¢ liates does not end with their initial visit and/or purchase. These
online users may later return to the advertiser through other web channels. They could
also refer other potential customers to the online retailer. Further, each a¢ liate may
cannibalize the marketing e¤ort of other a¢ liates and the retailer itself. Thus, the
manager of an online retailer should aim to account for these dynamic forces shaping
its a¢ liates network.
We aim to propose a modeling approach which enables a manager of an online retailer
to study the long term impact of each of its a¢ liates on tra¢ c, sales and revenues for
each of its tra¢ c sources. The modeling challenge is that typically the a¢ liate sites are
heterogeneous and very large in number. We propose to solve this curse of dimensionality
problem applying GVAR analysis developed by Pesaran et al (2004) and Dees et al (2007).
Our empirical analysis is based on data from an online retailer selling jewelry. We
conduct a GVAR analysis and use the GVAR solutions for forecasting and impulse re-
sponse analysis. We nd that the e¤ects of di¤erent shocks are heterogeneous across
a¢ liates. We observe spill-over as well as cannibalization e¤ects among a¢ liates. Over-
all, we think that GVAR analysis is an appropriate approach for a manager who seeks to
study dynamic relationships among its tra¢ c sources and a¢ liates. It is also a suitable
tool to examine the long-term e¤ectiveness of each a¢ liate website beyond the traditional
a¢ liate performance measures (e.g. conversion rate).
Our study raises several interesting questions in a¢ liate marketing which could be
addressed in future research. First, we do not explicitly model the structural changes
associated with entry of a website to the a¢ liate network. In the spirit of Pesaran,
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Smith, and Smith (2007), future research could use the modeling framework to quantify
the e¤ects of what if scenarios when other company joins to the a¢ liate network of
the retailer. Future research could also address dynamic relationship between a¢ liate
marketing performance and other online advertising channels. Finally, additional research
should analyze the consumer behavior after exposure to di¤erent types of a¢ liate webs,
building a taxonomy of communication strategies and the link between the reactions and
the long term performance e¤ects quantied in this article.
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